Former Russian ambassador to Colombia, Ednan Agaev has held senior positions in the Soviet and Russian Foreign Ministries, as well as at the United Nations. Based in Paris, he is now a consultant in international affairs.
Guillaume de Sardes: Almost ten days ago, on 28 February 2026, Israel and the United States jointly launched an attack on Iran, targeting both military targets and strategic infrastructure. In your opinion, what are the objectives of this attack?
Ednan Agaev: The main objective of this operation, at least officially, is to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons production capabilities. But that is not the only objective. The United States and Israel also want to destroy or drastically reduce the military potential of a country that has become a source of threat, above all to Israel, and a destabilising factor in neighbouring countries. Finally, ideally, the United States and Israel would like to see regime change, i.e. the ousting of the mullahs, who in recent years have been perceived as increasingly aggressive.
The Israelis claim to have killed Ayatollah Khamenei. This assassination of a head of state, which follows the kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, poses a legal problem. But beyond that, how do you think it will be interpreted by Iran’s allies, particularly Russia and China?
There is, however, an important difference between the removal of Maduro and the elimination of Ayatollah Khamenei. I agree that Maduro’s removal raises a legal question, but we have already had a similar case in relatively recent history, when the United States overthrew and removed Panama’s strongman, General Noriega. Maduro was specifically targeted by the United States, which accused him, as it had Noriega before him, of involvement in drug trafficking. This was therefore not a preventive war against Venezuela. From the American perspective, it was a matter of neutralising a gangster. The case of Iran, by contrast, appears completely different. Iran was developing a civilian nuclear programme that aroused suspicion not only in the United States and Israel, but also in the majority of the international community. Many believed that it had a military dimension. The Iranian leadership’s stubbornness in maintaining a certain opacity on this subject, despite supposedly reassuring statements, explains the rise in tensions and the way in which the situation has deteriorated. It is true that it was Trump himself, during his first term in office, who decided to abandon the multilateral agreement drawn up with the participation of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, Germany and the IAEA, an agreement that had been approved by a UN Security Council resolution and is known by the acronym JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). Trump’s abandonment of this agreement led to increased mistrust and, in effect, ruined all efforts to ensure the transparency of Iran’s nuclear programme.
Today, it is very difficult to say how things would have unfolded if this agreement had not been abandoned. Did Iran sincerely intend to honour its commitments, or was the signing of this treaty merely a ploy to secretly continue developing its military nuclear programme? In any case, it cannot be denied that Iran’s behaviour on the international stage, the development of its ballistic missile programme, its interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, and its support for terrorist groups could legitimately raise doubts about the sincerity of the leaders of the mullahs’ regime… As for the elimination of Ayatollah Khamenei during the American-Israeli strikes, it was an act of war dictated by objective necessities.
Regarding the reaction of Iran’s so-called allies, we must first ask ourselves this question: are China and Russia really Iran’s allies? It seems to me that China is pursuing purely pragmatic interests: it wants to secure its oil supply. This issue is more important to China than the nature of the Iranian regime. The proof is the concern it has shown since the start of the war and its repercussions on energy flows from Iran and the Gulf countries to its territory.
From Moscow’s perspective, Iran is above all a powerful player in a region fraught with potential challenges to the security of the Russian Federation. Historically, relations between Russia and Iran have been marked by rivalry, with both countries seeking to establish their influence in the Caucasus and (to a lesser extent) in Central Asia. After decades of war, the two countries reached a form of coexistence in the 19th century based on a balance of interests. From this perspective, Iran is not an ally, but rather a neighbour that must be treated as a partner, lest it become a dangerous rival. While Russia is satisfied with its current partnership with Iran, this does not mean that it will allow itself to be drawn into dangerous adventures to support its regime.
Ayatollah Khamenei has always opposed nuclear weapons on religious grounds. Is there not now a risk that he will be succeeded by someone who believes that obtaining the atomic bomb is the only way – as the example of North Korea shows – to protect Iran’s integrity? In other words, just as the policy of maximum pressure against North Korea resulted in the creation of a Korean intercontinental missile equipped with nuclear warheads, is there not a risk that Israeli-American intervention will lead to the very thing it was supposed to prevent?
I have no illusions about the personality of the late Ayatollah Khamenei. He was no saint, and certainly no peaceful Santa Claus. He was the one who led Iran when it became a threat to the entire Middle East by financing and arming extremist movements and terrorist groups. It is not easy to engage in so-called civilised dialogue when the other party not only fails to respect any standards of conduct, but does not even understand them. To put it bluntly, I do not believe that the current regime can be replaced by an even worse one… However, the example of Afghanistan shows that this possibility cannot be ruled out. The American-Israeli operation seems to take this into account, as it aims to destroy not only Iranian weapons, but also their production facilities. Thus, even if the mullahs’ regime were to be replaced by an even worse regime, that regime would no longer have any possibility of threatening its neighbours.
It was this logic that led Israel to carry out strikes against military infrastructure in Syria in December 2024, after the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
That’s right. Israel did carry out air strikes at the end of 2024 to destroy most of Syria’s military capabilities. The aim was to prevent the resurgence of a threat near the northern border, as Bashar al-Assad was replaced as Syria’s leader by a worrying figure, the jihadist Abu Mohammed al-Joulani.
In response to the Israeli-American attack, Iran bombed American bases in various Gulf countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait (but not Saudi Arabia or Oman). How do you think these countries will react to this violation of their sovereignty?
These missile and drone attacks are further evidence of the aggressive nature of the Iranian regime. It was not the Arab countries that launched this operation, and Iran’s justification for its attacks, namely that these countries are allowing the United States to use their territory, is questionable. Under international law, as these states have remained neutral, they should not be targeted, as they are legally third parties to the conflict. However, this is a complex issue. The legal assessment depends on the role that US bases currently play in the conflict. Depending on this role, they could lose their neutral status and be considered legitimate military targets.
As for the response that Arab countries will give to these attacks, we can see that despite the fact that they have a legitimate right to defend themselves and counterattack, they remain cautious. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states — notably Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait — have condemned the Iranian strikes as a violation of their territorial sovereignty, but have stopped short of taking further action. Their priority appears to be to avoid direct military escalation.
According to Chas Freeman, former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, citing an Israeli source, this attack had been planned for a long time, since it was decided on 29 December in Mar-a-Lago. This casts doubt on the sincerity of the negotiations conducted so far by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. As a former diplomat, what do you think of the current tendency to favour force over dialogue? Do you think it is sustainable? Has our world changed?
It is impossible to say today whether the Trump administration’s intentions were sincere or not. Any discussion on this subject would be pure speculation. Knowing their usual way of negotiating, I believe that the Americans would have preferred to reach an agreement without having to resort to force. They had warned Iran that if it did not agree to abandon its military nuclear programme, its ballistic missile programme, its support for terrorist groups and its aggressive attitude towards Israel, then they would use force in conjunction with Israel. The Americans never hid the fact that this was an option. They even began deploying their air and naval forces to convince the Iranians that they were not bluffing. Diplomacy, even in the American interpretation, is the art of the possible.
Do you think this war could lead to regime change, as Trump seems to hope, even though he has not said so officially?
It is too early to say. That choice is up to the Iranians themselves. If they prefer a Western-style democracy, so much the better; if they prefer to maintain a theocracy, that will have to be respected by the international community, provided that Iran stops threatening its neighbours.
