The United States has launched a long-prepared operation to forcibly lift the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. It is difficult to say whether the White House genuinely counted on successful negotiations with Iran’s new authorities or used them as cover while preparing a military operation. One thing is clear: the negotiations have failed, and the US Navy and Army are now moving to a new phase of the war.
The goal is to exit the conflict with minimal damage to American foreign policy. Tehran must gain nothing from the situation: Iran must not control navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and must be stripped of the ability to strike its neighbors. Only then will the United States be able to leave this poorly planned conflict without paying a political price.
Why the strait matters so much
Before the war, a significant share of global consumption of oil, gas and fertilizers passed through the Strait of Hormuz. The closure of this route has already triggered a crisis across South Asia, a global shortage of aviation fuel, and accelerating inflation around the world.
For Iran’s new authorities, control over the strait is the symbol of victory in this war and a source of compensation for the destruction the conflict has brought. Tehran is effectively claiming economic and political control over the entire Persian Gulf. That is precisely why the Trump administration cannot simply declare victory and leave: its Gulf allies would not accept it.
What “Project Freedom” is and what remains unclear
The Trump administration named its operation to unblock the strait “Project Freedom.” What exactly this entails was unclear from the outset: American military officials and civilian advisers gave two different accounts. US Central Command and Trump himself stated that the strait would be opened by force, naval vessels and aircraft would escort civilian ships. Shortly afterward, anonymous officials clarified to the Wall Street Journal that the use of force was not yet on the table, and that “Project Freedom” would begin with financial measures: insurance subsidies and similar steps.
On May 4, the first day of the “project,” American destroyers entered the strait, most likely as a probe, not an attempt to convoy civilian vessels. Iran responded immediately and predictably. Several civilian ships were attacked by drones and fast boats, attempts were made to strike the American destroyers themselves, and dozens of missiles and drones were launched at the UAE, including against the Fujairah oil refinery, which caught fire. The strikes continued on May 5. The result of the first day: a complete closure of the strait — even the most risk-tolerant shipowners and crews abandoned any attempt to break through the blockade on their own.
The Iranian threat
The American task is militarily complex for a fundamental reason: Iran does not need to sink every ship or destroy every warship to maintain the blockade, regular strikes that radically reduce traffic are enough. The United States, by contrast, must neutralize all threats simultaneously.
Iran’s arsenal includes light patrol boats and unmanned vessels, video-guided drones, naval mines, including magnetic ones, and anti-ship cruise missiles positioned along the entire coastline, including in bunkers carved into mountains. Most of Iran’s specialized minelayers have been destroyed, but mines can still be laid from any vessel, including civilian ones. In February, Reuters reported that Iran was attempting to procure Chinese supersonic cruise missiles in circumvention of the arms embargo, they would pose a serious threat to the US Navy.
The plan to break the blockade
According to retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, former commanding officer of the aircraft carrier George Washington, the operation would need to unfold in several successive phases. First, at least two weeks of massive air and naval strikes against drone depots, anti-ship missile launchers, missile boats and minelayers. Then, the deployment of guided-missile destroyers equipped with the Aegis system, along with Littoral Combat Ships for minesweeping. And only after that, a first trial convoy of a small number of tankers, escorted by destroyers and air cover: helicopters, A-10 attack aircraft and fighters armed with cheap guided missiles designed to take down drones.
In total, protecting convoys and the region’s ports would require roughly 12 to 14 guided-missile destroyers, Montgomery estimates. Of the approximately 40 nominally available ships, half are currently in repair or undergoing modernization.
Why the plan is risky and why Trump is hesitating
The Strait of Hormuz is narrow: the main shipping lane runs roughly 30 kilometers from the Iranian coast. A missile fired from 10 to 15 kilometers offshore reaches a convoy in 80 to 90 seconds — “very uncomfortable,” in Montgomery’s words. If Iran manages to fire eight or more missiles simultaneously, the consequences could be catastrophic.
The second risk is economic. Even if the Navy minimizes losses among civilian vessels, the mere fact of periodic attacks will make insurance prohibitively expensive. Many shipowners will prefer to pay Iran for safe passage rather than insure their vessels at wartime rates. As early as March, the United States attempted to subsidize war-risk insurance through the US International Development Finance Corporation, it did not work: shipowners refused so long as the risk of losing ships and crew remained extreme.
