Jean de Gliniasty is a French diplomat. He was French Ambassador in Russia from 2009 to 2013, a country about which he has written numerous articles and essays.
Guillaume de Sardes: The war between Russia and NATO-backed Ukraine has now been going on for more than four years. French President Macron wrote on his Twitter account: ‘This war is a triple failure for Russia: military, economic and strategic.’ (24 February 2026). This assessment seems a little optimistic when we consider that Russia now occupies a fifth of Ukrainian territory (roughly equivalent to the size of Bulgaria), that despite sanctions, its average growth over the period 2022-2025 was 2% (compared to 1.5% for the European Union), and that Russia is not diplomatically isolated, particularly within the BRICS. On the other hand, it is true that Ukraine is putting up heroic resistance and that the front line has not collapsed, despite the Russian advance. How do you assess the overall situation after four years of conflict?
Jean de Gliniasty: It is a fact that Russia has lost Ukraine. In 2010, Mr Yanukovych, considered pro-Russian, was elected President of Ukraine in elections deemed fair by the OSCE. The first Maidan protests in December 2013 were directed against the regime’s corruption and the abandonment of the association agreement with Europe rather than against Russia. At the time, the pro-Russian Party of Regions still represented a third of the electorate. The invasion put an end to this diversity and united the Ukrainian people, beyond cultural and linguistic differences, in a common and lasting hatred of Russia. This is Mr Putin’s great failure. The rest – initial military failures and attrition warfare, territorial gains, the relative effectiveness of economic sanctions, diplomatic successes that have ended Russia’s isolation – may ultimately appear secondary to the loss of Ukraine, which, if it survives as a state, will remain anchored to the Western world. But perhaps the Russian president felt that Ukraine was already lost to Russia and attempted a kind of gamble to win it back. In that case, it is a failure, at least as long as Ukraine holds out militarily. The courage and military prowess of the Ukrainians may suggest this, but if negotiations remain deadlocked, Ukraine’s fate will be decided over time.
Discussions are currently taking place in Geneva between the Americans and the Russians. Could you tell us what is at stake in the context of the war in Ukraine and, more broadly, in the context of Russian-American relations?
In Anchorage, on 15 August 2025, Mr Putin laid down conditions for a peace agreement: eradication of the root causes of the war (NATO, the Russian language, the Orthodox Church, etc.) and, above all, withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the Donbass region not occupied by the Russians (although constitutionally annexed) and heavily fortified by the Ukrainians (Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, etc.). These conditions are clearly unacceptable to the Ukrainians, at least as long as they hold out militarily.
The 28-point plan presented by Mr Trump on 20 November 2025 largely reflected Russian positions. It was described as capitulation by the Europeans, who, in a new 20-point plan presented at the end of December, secured the inclusion of Ukrainian concerns, particularly on the issue of security guarantees given to Ukraine in the event of an agreement.
The European ‘coalition of the willing’ has signalled the willingness of certain countries to participate in these guarantees, notably by providing ground troops (but mostly on condition of American ‘umbrella’ protection). It seems that the new round of negotiations opened in Abu Dhabi in January and February, and in Geneva, has clarified certain points, in particular American participation in security guarantees, control of the demarcation line, NATO, and some of the root causes of the war, but it has not resolved the territorial issue.
It is difficult to say whether Russia was truly prepared to sign if agreement was reached on its proposals. But it seems likely that the issue will be resolved on the ground.
Europeans support the idea of a compromise peace in which Russia and Ukraine would meet halfway between their respective positions. The problem, it seems to me, is that the concessions they hope to obtain from Putin mainly concern the issues that led him to go to war in the first place, such as the presence of NATO troops on Ukrainian territory. Do you think such an agreement can be reached, or will peace be achieved on Russia’s terms? When do you think this might happen?
The problem is that after the regrettable failure of the Minsk agreements (2015), which they were unable to implement, the Europeans, for perfectly justifiable reasons, had no other position than that of the Ukrainians. They did not show any autonomous capacity, at least publicly, to present their own compromise solutions. Like Kiev, they long advocated a return to the 2014 borders, then to the 2022 lines. They exerted pressure, publicly in the case of Boris Johnson, to prevent Zelensky from continuing the negotiations, already in their final stages, on the compromise drawn up in Istanbul in April 2022.
Shaken by Trump’s initiatives, they worked in two directions: developing, within the coalition of volunteers, security guarantees applicable to Ukraine in the event of an agreement, and influencing Washington to stop putting pressure solely on Kiev and to modify their compromise proposals to take Ukrainian interests into account. This, in turn, made them unacceptable to Moscow.
In any case, the Russians will never accept NATO troops on Ukrainian territory, as this would amount to admitting defeat, at least in terms of the war aims they have invoked. The process initiated by Trump is currently on hold due to the war in Iran and the difficulty of reaching a territorial compromise. In the meantime, the Russians are continuing to exert pressure on the front line in the hope of obtaining by force what they have not achieved through negotiation.
In the current war of attrition, despite Western aid, Russia has gained the upper hand thanks to the size of its economy and population. Do you think Russia’s objectives could go beyond the complete takeover of the four recently annexed oblasts? The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) believes that Russia could seek to continue the war to reach Odessa, in order to deprive Ukraine of its access to the Black Sea. Does that seem possible to you?
The validity of any Ukrainian concessions depends on knowledge of Russia’s true objectives. The loss of five oblasts (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Crimea) would be a high price to pay for the Russians to resume their offensive later from better positions. This is all the more true given that Putin and his minister Lavrov regularly mention ‘Novaia Rossia’ or New Russia as Russia’s war aim, which includes the port of Odessa, the occupation of which would mean the economic suffocation of Ukraine.
Instead of welcoming Trump’s 28-point plan, which largely addressed their concerns, the Russians ‘quibbled’ and, without formally rejecting it, asked to negotiate the details. The Russians have repeatedly said that they want the four oblasts (Crimea is no longer an issue for them) and the eradication of the root causes of the war, but ambiguity remains as to their real intentions.
This uncertainty surrounding Russia’s objectives means that security guarantees will be key to any potential agreement. It seems that progress has been made on this point in Abu Dhabi and Geneva, but the issue remains a pressing one. In any case, it is clear that many factors in Moscow favour a territorial compromise: Ukrainian resistance, economic stagnation, growing weariness among the population, sanctions limiting resources from declining hydrocarbon exports, and the deterioration of Russia’s diplomatic positions in the Caucasus, Central Asia and elsewhere.
However, the war in Iran will undoubtedly give a boost to Russian oil exports and prices, and therefore to Moscow’s financial resources (the United States has allowed India to continue importing Russian oil for another month without incurring punitive tariffs). Any Ukrainian weakness on the ground would also be an incentive to continue the war beyond the four oblasts. The Russians have said that they will achieve their objectives through negotiation or war, but there is a fear that continuing the war could lead to an expansion of those objectives in the face of an exhausted and devastated Ukraine.
In recent months, Russia appears to have changed its military strategy, stepping up its attacks on Ukraine’s energy network and critical infrastructure such as railways, bridges, etc. Even if peace were to be signed this year, this destruction would limit the possibilities for economic recovery. We can also imagine that there will be intense political clashes in Ukraine. How do you see the post-war period in Ukraine?
The Russians had already bombed energy sites during the winter of 2024–2025, but on a small scale. There was even a brief truce, as the Ukrainians attacked Russian oil facilities in retaliation. More recently, the oil terminal in Novorossiysk was severely damaged, causing concern among Kazakhs, who export some of their hydrocarbons via Russia, and the Americans.
This winter, all Ukrainian infrastructure has been targeted and the intensity of the bombing has been unprecedented. This is a manifestation of the rise in Russian production of drones (1,000 per month) and missiles, an attempt to destroy the industrial and energy base of the Ukrainian war effort, but above all a means of putting pressure on public opinion. As usual, the result was the opposite of what was expected, as the Ukrainians closed ranks.
The post-war period will depend on the outcome of negotiations or fighting. If an agreement is reached, it will contain provisions for the reconstruction of the country, as is the case with the 28-point and 20-point plans. The Russians have even considered allocating part of the assets frozen by the Europeans to this effort. The Americans intend to play a leading role in the operation, and it is likely that they will succeed. It will be a considerable task, but not an insurmountable one, given the mobilisation of the Ukrainians, the willingness of all to participate in the country’s recovery and the economic opportunities it opens up.
If no agreement is reached and the war continues, Ukraine will continue to see its infrastructure systematically destroyed and will have to rely on European aid to maintain it. As long as the war continues, the political position of Zelensky, an excellent war leader, will remain strong. If an agreement is reached and elections are held, he will probably have to step down, as Churchill and de Gaulle did in the past after the victory in 1945. In the event of a Ukrainian defeat and surrender (a scenario that is still unlikely and unthinkable for Europeans), the political situation will be very confused and the Russians will want to have their say…
From a broader perspective, the war in Ukraine has accelerated and highlighted the emergence of a multipolar world, where the West no longer seems capable of determining the outcome of conflicts. Its power has eroded since reaching its peak in the 1990s. According to Professor John J. Mearsheimer, we are now entering a period of ‘new Cold War’. He believes that the world will now be organised around three poles: the United States, China and Russia, with the latter two being allies. Do you agree with this analysis? Or do you think that, once peace has been established, relations can be resumed between Russia and the United States (which seems to be Trump’s wish) and between Russia and the European Union (which does not seem to be the position of Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas)?
At the height of its power, the West, even as the victor, was never able to determine the outcome of conflicts, whether in Vietnam, Iraq, Libya or elsewhere. This is even more true now. The emerging multipolarity will certainly be organised around Sino-American rivalry, but it will be much more fluid than the Cold War.
New centres of power have emerged around countries that are now developed, dynamic and eager for influence, power and prestige (Turkey, India, Indonesia, Brazil, etc.). Europe, which has not yet achieved this level of power, is also seeking to play a role. Russia, weakened after its war in Ukraine, will instead seek to come out on top, remain a centre of influence, reconnect with the West without sacrificing its relationship with China, regain its positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and consolidate them in Africa (where they are more fragile than they appear) and everywhere else.
The Cold War was a fairly fixed and predictable way of organising the world that will not be repeated. The game will become more open and unstable. Trump would already like to normalise relations with Russia in order to distance it somewhat from China and, above all, to cultivate ‘business opportunities’, as they say. Europe is not quite ready for this, as its policy is strongly influenced by the countries of Central Europe (Estonian ‘Foreign Minister’ Kaja Kalas, Lithuanian Defence Commissioner Kubilius, and even the German President of the Commission), but if an agreement is reached in Ukraine, this position may change and we may see a race for the Russian market.
The outcome of the war in Iran will also bring about a kind of redistribution of roles, and it is not certain that Washington will be the beneficiary. In fact, the notion of ‘multi-alignment’ put forward by India seems to me to be more in line with reality than that of a return to the Cold War. But it is certain that the situation will be incomparably more dangerous.
