Jack A. Goldstone is one of the most influential contemporary theorists of revolutions and social transformation. He is the author of structural-demographic theory, which links revolutionary crises to demographic pressure, elite conflict, and the fiscal weakness of the state. His work is widely used both in academic research and in applied analyses of political instability and state crises.
Maria Kuznetsova Has the nature of revolution itself changed since the eighteenth–twentieth centuries, or have only its outward forms evolved (its speed, channels of mobilization, types of actors etc.), while its underlying logic remains fundamentally the same?
Jack A. Goldstone: The underlying logic of revolutions has not changed, as is clear from the fact that the very same models (the structural-demographic model of political instability developed by myself and further developed by Peter Turchin) accurately explain the onset of the French Revolution of 1789, the Arab Uprisings of 2010-2011, and the MAGA revolution in the United States that is ongoing today.
Yet as is also clear from this varied set of events, outward forms have certainly changed! The fundamental logic is that a regime is only overthrown when multiple conditions simultaneously are in place: a financial or military weakening of the regime shown by increasing state debts, rapid inflation, and/or military setbacks; elite divisions and defections from the regime; widespread popular grievances that support the mobilization of a broad coalition of different groups against the regime; international interventions or conditions that further weaken the regime or support the regime’s opponents; and the spread of a mobilizing narrative or ideology that inspires, focuses, and unites the opposition to the regime.
At the same time, as the forms and institutions of government and political life have evolved over time, so too has the outward appearance and dynamics of revolutions. When most states were ruled by hereditary kings and aristocrats presiding over mainly rural societies, revolutions usually took the form of violent urban and peasant uprisings against landlords and royal forces. That started to change in the 19th and 20th centuries, when more societies became urban and ruled by military rulers or elected dictators. We still saw peasant revolutions in poorer societies, but more revolutions by urban protests (such as the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in Europe, or the Republican Revolution of 1911 in China). By the 20th century, we began to see fascist revolutions against weak democracies (in Italy, Germany and Japan before World War II), and peaceful “color” revolutions – like that in the Philippines in 1986 and those that took place across Communist Eastern Europe in 1989-1991. Revolutions in this century are more commonly semi-violent urban uprisings in poorer countries (like the “Gen Z” revolution in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Madagascar), peaceful revolutions of mass protest like those in the Ukraine in 2014 and Armenia in 2018, and “electoral revolutions” like those in Venezuela under Chavez or the US under Trump, in which a populist leader mobilizes people for an electoral campaign under the banner of revolution and the promise of radical change and then bends the laws and reshapes or dismantles prior political institutions.
The logic of revolution will likely remain the same, if only because a financially strong government with united elite support is difficult if not impossible to overthrow. But the forms of revolution have changed as political relationships and institutions changed.
Maria Kuznetsova: You emphasize that revolutions begin long before mass protests become visible. Within your theoretical framework, is it possible to quantitatively identify the point at which a political system loses its functional integrity? In other words, is there a set of measurable indicators (or a particular configuration of them) that allows us to diagnose entry into a pre-revolutionary phase with reasonable confidence?
Jack A. Goldstone: It is important to remember that a revolution is a process, not a single event. And no, there is no single indicator that portends when a country that is showing signs of political instability or conditions favorable to revolution actually starts to experience government breakdown. That is why revolutions are usually such a surprise – even near the end leaders are certain that the protests or strikes “will die down” or “will be brought under control,” and are stunned when the military finally runs away or protestors are able to storm the capital. We can track factors such as regime finances, elite unity or polarization, popular living standards, nationalist grievances, and the presence or absence of influential opposition leaders. But even if elevated, these only indicate a potential for revolution, not a certainty, and they do not tell us when a regime will fail. For example, in the Philippines revolution of 1996 against Ferdinand Marcos, the evident weakness of the Marcos regime led the opposition leader Ninoy Aquino to return to the Philippines to challenge Marcos. But it was Ninoy’s assassination that led to the mass movement supporting his widow, Corazon Aquino, in the following presidential election, and then the peaceful protests that drove Marcos from power after he attempted to falsely claim victory in that election. If Ninoy had not been killed, and instead won a normal election campaign, there might not have been a revolution. There is always an element of chance, or contingency, in the development of revolutionary situations. There is always an element of chance, or contingency, in the development of revolutionary situations.
Maria Kuznetsova: Within your structural-demographic theory, the youth bulge was seen as a central driver of mobilization. How do you adapt this concept to societies marked by demographic aging and low fertility, yet characterized by high status expectations and a structural shortage of upward mobility and elite positions?
Jack A. Goldstone : You are correct that in the structural-demographic theory, the youth bulge is considered one factor that leads to mass mobilization against the regime. Young people are more available for mobilization and if discontented, are more readily recruited into more idealistic or radical movements. And research has shown that statistically, countries with a large youth bulge are more prone to political violence and political instability than countries with smaller youth populations. We saw this in the Arab uprisings, the Gen Z revolutions, and in the political instability in many places in Africa today.
But it is only one factor, and not always the most important one. For example, in my book Revolution and Rebellion I highlighted Japan’s Meiji Revolution as a major transformative event—and it occurred at a time that Japan’s population had been stable for almost two centuries. What happened there is that the Japanese regime (the Shogunate) collected taxes in rice; and over those two centuries, as population remained stagnant but rice output grew, the real value of government income fell, leading the Shogunate to fall into deeper and deeper debts to Osaka moneylenders. At the same time, the samurai ranks grew more and more crowded, with educated administrative samurai rising in numbers while the military warrior samurai lost incomes and became fewer. When the leading feudal lords of the southwest decided that, in the face of Japanese weakness against Europeans and Americans, the Shogun’s government was an obstacle to Japan’s mobilization, these lords led an armed rebellion against the Shogun, and after winning they ended the military samurai warriors’ privileges and built new administrative and business structures using the broader samurai class. Something similar happened in the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, where Communist Party members were like the samurai. As those countries fell economically further behind the west, Communist governments fell into debt trying to keep up with Western military spending and importing consumer goods; and when nationalist leaders in Warsaw Pact countries and the non-Russian national republics in the USSR decided the communist regime was an obstacle to their modernization and future prosperity, they rose up against it (by mobilizing peaceful mass protests), and after winning ended the Communist parties and the privileges of Party members. No youth bulges there either.
Revolutions can occur with or without youth bulges. But where youth bulges exist revolutions tend to be more radical and more violent; where societies have older populations their revolutions generally take the form of peaceful mass protests.
Maria Kuznetsova: In Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, you show that revolutions often follow prolonged periods of institutional rigidity and declining adaptive capacity. Which macroeconomic, political, or governance indicators do you regard as the most reliable signs of such systemic non-viability today, and to what extent are these indicators applicable to contemporary authoritarian regimes?
Jack A. Goldstone: Let me be clear: in the book and in the Structural Demographic Theory I never claim that demography is destiny, somehow determining events. Rather, demographic changes pose challenges, and political instability arises when short-sighted elites focus more on competition for power than solving long-term problems, or stubbornly try to stick with institutions that are no longer functioning well, producing problems of financial distress, worsening elite factionalism and polarization, and popular misery. The indicators showing non-viability today include: (1) rising state debts despite strong economic growth; (2) an overproduction of elites such that even college graduates have a declining advantage and less security in the job market (especially for the most recent graduates) and social mobility has fallen drastically compared to previous generations (3) A swelling chorus of complaints about the affordability of food, housing, and health care from much of the population at the same time that the rich are getting much richer and much faster than ever (more technically, a decline in the average wage relative to the rise of overall GDP per capita). By the way, these indicators are harbingers of political instability in BOTH authoritarian and democratic regimes. Even regimes that have elected leaders, such as Nepal and Bangladesh, can have revolutions if the regimes grow corrupt, indebted, and are deserted by elites and provoke widespread popular grievances.
Maria Kuznetsova: How do you incorporate digital communication, social media, and global information flows into your model of revolutionary dynamics? Do they function as an independent structural variable, or primarily as accelerants of pre-existing crises? And in this context, to what extent can communication disruptions and internet blackouts, such as those observed in Iran, undermine protest self-organization?
Jack A. Goldstone: Revolutions have always depended on regime opponents being able to communicate among themselves, and revolutionary leaders to communicate with their followers, to spread revolutionary ideology, spread news of regime faults, build revolutionary organizations, and plan revolutionary actions. In 17th century England, much of this communication was through sermons in Protestant churches; in 18th century France and the U.S., it was by pamphlet wars; in the 19th century it was by telegraph and printed books and newspapers; in the 20thcentury it was by radio and television; and in the 21st century it is by social media. And everywhere, it was by neighborhood word of mouth and rumors. Communication blackouts and disruptions do have some impact on revolutionary mobilization, but I do not think it is decisive; only when combined with harsh physical repression of protests does it really matter, as then those blackouts make it difficult for scattered opposition elements to regroup. A bigger problem with modern internet communication is how easily that is surveilled or flooded with misinformation by the government. Both of these make it harder to use internet communication long term to inspire and build a mass base supporting the opposition.
A bigger problem with modern internet communication is how easily that is surveilled or flooded with misinformation by the government. Both of these make it harder to use internet communication long term to inspire and build a mass base supporting the opposition.
Maria Kuznetsova: In your article for The Atlantic, you wrote that all the conditions for revolution are present in Iran: social pressure, loss of legitimacy, elite conflict, and a structural crisis of the state. Given the scale of repression and the absence of regime change, does this still constitute a revolution within your framework?
Jack A. Goldstone: Yes, and it is still early – I do think the mass protests this year may have begun a death spiral for the regime. As I write this, negotiations between the US and Iran have broken down and a 2nd carrier group is joining the US Armada in the Persian Gulf. We do not know what will happen, but it appears the US plans to intensify pressure on the Iranian regime. If that involves bombing headquarters of the Revolutionary Guards and/or Basij, that may bring people into the streets to seek regime change. Or, alternatively, US pressure may inspire the Revolutionary Guard to seize power, or may lead Ayatollah Khomeini to make some concessions in return for a US withdrawal; in that case there may be no revolution or instability until Khomeini’s death. Again, revolution is a process. However, most of the people of Iran no longer believe in the Islamic destiny espoused by the clerical regime; that regime has lost its main military allies in Hamas and Hezbollah; the economy is failing and most Iranians are struggling; the bazaar merchants and urban middle classes led this last round of protests, not the poor. Neither Russia nor China is rushing to Iran’s aid, and the U.S. is putting relentless pressure on the regime. Given all these factors in play, it would be surprising to me if the Ayatollah’s government is still in place at the beginning of next year.
Maria Kuznetsova: The 1979 Iranian Revolution was built on a broad social coalition from bazaar merchants to leftist and religious movements. Do you see in today’s Iran a comparable social core capable not only of sustained protest, but of forming a durable alternative political coalition?
Jack A. Goldstone: Yes, I do. Former Tehran MP Ali-Akbar Mousavi Khoeini recently returned from a trip to Iran in January, and he said:
«I never thought that such a will and readiness for major change existed across every spectrum, movement, age group, and geographical area.»
Whether the opposition comes to focus on the Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, who has offered himself as a transitional leader, or some other leadership group, I think a very wide range of social groups in Iran – students, workers, professionals, merchants, youth, women, ethnic minorities – are eager to unite behind a leadership that will seek to change the regime.
Maria Kuznetsova: History offers cases in which extreme repression temporarily halted revolutionary movements, only for them to re-emerge with greater force. According to your theory, what is the maximum temporal horizon over which revolutionary potential can survive under conditions of sustained and severe repression?
Jack A. Goldstone: I would turn your question around and ask: what is the maximum time over which a government can maintain authority by force in the face of economic decay, declining legitimacy, loss of allies, and foreign pressure? The answer has generally been a matter of months, or a year or two at most.
Some point to the Chinese repression of the Tiananmen protests as comparable to what just happened in Iran. It was not. The Tiananmen protests were primarily a student protest, and when they occurred in 1989, China had recently seen the initial leader of the Communist Revolution, Mao Zedong and his close cronies pass from power, while a new regime with radically new ideas was well into launching the most successful economic reforms in history. Nothing like that has happened in Iran – instead these protests have a much wider base, and the economy is still failing at the hands of a leadership deeply tied to the policies of the revolution’s initial leader, Ayatollah Khomeini.
Could Iran avoid a revolution? Yes, certainly, if a new leadership comes to power that is committed to a radical change, such as abandoning Iran’s nuclear enrichment to strike a deal that lifts Western economic sanctions, and reducing the corruption and economic enrichment of the Revolutionary Guards in order to free the economy for wider entrepreneurship and foreign investment. Iran at one point seemed on that path, with Iranian President Rouhani working with U.S. President Obama, and could conceivably return to it. But to me that seems unlikely; so the odds still favor some kind of revolutionary upheaval in the months ahead.
