Iran is now earning nearly twice as much from its oil exports as it did before the start of the conflict with the United States and Israel, despite sanctions and military risks. It is effectively “winning the energy war,” writes The Economist.
Amid the conflict, countries in the Persian Gulf are facing declining revenues and reduced production. Logistical disruptions, the risk of attacks, and regional instability have hit traditional exporters. By contrast, Iran has not only maintained its export volumes but also increased its revenues thanks to higher prices and the restructuring of its export channels.
Exact export data remains opaque due to sanctions and the wartime environment. According to estimates, Iran exports between 2.4 and 2.8 million barrels of oil and petroleum products per day, including around 1.5 to 1.8 million barrels of crude. These levels are comparable to, or even higher than, last year’s figures. However, higher prices are significantly boosting revenues.
Officially, exports are handled by the National Iranian Oil Company, but the reality is far more complex. In a context of foreign currency shortages, oil has become a form of payment. Its sale is managed by various internal structures, ranging from diplomatic channels to security forces and religious foundations. According to several sources, control over key flows is concentrated in the hands of a small circle of actors, many of whom are linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Since the conflict began, the role of the IRGC has expanded, particularly in controlling logistics, tanker movements, and maritime security.
The Strait of Hormuz plays a central role in this system. A critical chokepoint for global energy flows, it is now closely monitored by Iran, which escorts tankers and secures shipments. This gives Tehran significant leverage over global energy routes.
At the same time, Iran has developed sophisticated mechanisms to bypass sanctions. Its tanker fleet actively conceals the origin of oil: transponders are switched off, documents are falsified, and ship-to-ship transfers take place at sea, particularly off the coasts of Southeast Asia. As a result, these flows become extremely difficult to trace.
The main buyer remains China, which absorbs more than 90% of exports. Iranian oil is purchased by independent refineries, primarily in Shandong province. Officially separate from major state-owned companies, they avoid sanctions exposure while remaining de facto integrated into China’s energy system.
Another notable shift is the reduction in discounts. Whereas Iran previously sold its oil at heavily discounted prices, this gap has largely narrowed. Reduced supply from other Gulf producers has supported demand, bringing Iranian oil prices closer to market levels.
Finally, financial channels have been significantly adapted. Payments are routed through temporary trust accounts in smaller Chinese banks, registered under shell companies. Funds are then redistributed through a chain of accounts, allowing transactions to bypass restrictions. This system is overseen by structures linked to the defense sector and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
In the end, Iran has built a flexible and decentralized export model that is far less vulnerable to external pressure. Sanctions and military risks have not slowed the oil sector — they have accelerated its transformation.
