On 10 and 11 November, Abu Dhabi will host a new phase of diplomacy in an attempt to find a way out of the war in Ukraine. American, Russian and Ukrainian representatives will meet for the first time since the rounds held last January and February – in Abu Dhabi then too, and later in Geneva. According to Steve Witkoff, who announced the meeting, the discussions will cover post-war security guarantees, military de-escalation, humanitarian issues and the next steps towards a possible settlement. The Russians, for their part, wish to concentrate on the first of these.
The make-up of the meeting is, in itself, already a political event. The United States, Russia and Ukraine will be present; Europe will not.
The choice of venue is no accident. The United Arab Emirates, which has already facilitated several prisoner exchanges and hosted the first direct contacts between Russian and Ukrainian delegations, has established itself as an intermediary acceptable to all parties. That a Gulf capital should have become one of the places where the future of European security is discussed says a great deal about the redistribution of roles now under way.
A European Conflict Without Europeans
The absence of the Europeans is all the more striking given that the conflict is taking place on their continent and that its strategic, economic and military consequences concern them first and foremost. How can it be that those who will have to come to terms with the results of a possible agreement are absent from the process through which it might be drawn up?
The paradox is not new. As early as February 2025, in Munich, the American special envoy Keith Kellogg had warned that Europe would not have a seat at the negotiating table: Washington would act as intermediary, while Kyiv and Moscow would be the protagonists. European capitals saw this as a passing provocation. Nearly two years later, it has become the rule.
The negotiations held last month confirmed it. On 20 October, in Oslo, Volodymyr Zelensky met Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner in the presence of the Norwegian Prime Minister and the Finnish President. The following day, Witkoff flew to St Petersburg to see Vladimir Putin, while the Commission let it be known that it was waiting for the American delegation to brief it on the outcome. The verb says it all: Europe does not negotiate; it is sent the minutes.
The Trap of Preconditions
Since the beginning of the war, the main European capitals have gradually locked their policy into a position they have turned into a matter of principle: no negotiation can take place unless it begins with a Russian withdrawal, the recognition of Kyiv’s territorial demands (Crimea included) and the acceptance of security guarantees for Ukraine defined by the Europeans alone.
This is to forget that any diplomacy which demands to obtain at the table what it has not won on the ground is chimerical. By turning political objectives into preconditions for any discussion, Europe has diminished its capacity for mediation. It has condemned itself to powerlessness and – it must be said – to a touch of ridicule as well… Today, most of the levers – pressure and incentives alike – capable of extracting concessions from Moscow and Kyiv lie in Washington.
If diplomacy is not needed to negotiate with those whose positions we share, it is needed to talk with those whose interests are opposed to ours. Refusing to accept this reality does not make the adversary disappear; it simply leaves other powers to organise the dialogue. Since 2022, the rare European contacts with Moscow have remained isolated and led nowhere; none has taken the form of a sustained negotiating channel comparable to the one now maintained by the American envoys , even though they are mere amateur diplomats.
Washington Regains the Initiative
The Trump administration has drawn the conclusions from this situation. It has resumed contact with Vladimir Putin without abandoning its discussions with Volodymyr Zelensky, with a view to bringing the two delegations together in Abu Dhabi. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, who have become the faces of American mediation, made back-to-back visits to Oslo and St Petersburg within a few days before announcing the resumption of the trilateral format. For its part, the Kremlin confirmed on 3 November the participation of a delegation led, as in previous rounds, by Vladimir Medinsky.
The American method is open to question, both in itself and in its results. It mixes diplomacy with wheeling and dealing, relies on envoys drawn from real estate rather than from the State Department, and in autumn 2025 produced a 28-point plan that Kyiv deemed unacceptable. But it has one undeniable advantage: it shuts no one out. In doing so, it gives itself a chance to reconcile the long-term interests of Ukraine, Russia, Europe and the United States, rather than vainly trying to make those of one camp prevail.
Nonetheless, the positions of Moscow and Kyiv remain far apart. The Kremlin repeats that no lasting settlement is conceivable unless its security interests are taken into account. On 3 November, Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, reiterated that the Russian position rests on the principle of the indivisibility of security – the notion that no state should be able to ensure its own security at the expense of another. It was a way of putting Russian concerns over NATO enlargement back at the centre of the debate. Kyiv, by contrast, rules out any neutrality and any limitation on its army, and is demanding robust Western military guarantees together with funding for its forces over ten years. Nothing, therefore, allows us to presume that the Abu Dhabi talks will lead to an agreement. But if an agreement does emerge one day, it is likely to come out of this tripartite format, and not out of any other.
Getting Back to the Negotiating Table
What would it take for Europe to become once again a negotiator acceptable to all parties? A few avenues may be suggested.
First, rather than seeking to seize frozen Russian assets in order to devote them to the war effort, the lifting of European sanctions could be linked, in one way or another, to the reconstruction of Ukraine. This would make Europe an indispensable player on the day after.
Second, Europeans should set about redefining the security architecture of the continent. They are rearming, and that is their right. But rearmament unaccompanied by any reflection on capping certain weapons systems and on the rules governing their deployment will produce nothing but an arms race. An order that does not take account of the concerns of all actors produces security for none.
Finally – and this is no doubt the most difficult part politically – a channel of dialogue with Moscow must be re-established, so as to be able to defend European interests directly rather than entrusting them to American envoys whose priorities lie elsewhere entirely. A balance of power – since the European Union sees itself as a power – endures only if the major actors agree on common rules. Yet one does not set rules with a neighbour one does not speak to.
The Risk of Relegation
Abu Dhabi could reveal a reality that European capitals prefer to ignore: by dint of confusing moral firmness with diplomatic strategy, Europe has deprived itself of its influence. While it remains directly concerned by the war, it is no longer one of the places where its outcome is decided.
The risk now is that peace in Ukraine will be negotiated without Europe, which will then be called upon to finance, guarantee or manage its consequences. Such a prospect would not merely be a diplomatic setback. It would mark a new stage in the strategic relegation of the continent.