Vladimir Brovkin is an emeritus professor at Harvard University, specializing in Soviet history and the Russian Civil War. His work focuses on the political and social dynamics of regime change, state violence, and post-imperial transitions. He now draws on this research to try to account for developments in the international order and the war between Russia and Ukraine.
Guillaume de Sardes: In our previous conversation, back in March, you said that a takeover of Odesa was “possible but not inevitable,” and that it would depend on how power evolves in Kyiv. Six months on, Mr. Zelensky still hasn’t put his presidential mandate up for a vote, and he is hardening his position by striking Russian energy infrastructure as well as tankers in the Black Sea. In response, Russia is imposing a blockade on the port of Odesa. How do you interpret this? Could it be a sign that Russia now intends to annex Odesa, or is it purely a strategy of economic strangulation?
Vladimir Brovkin: Russia’s bombing of Odessa’s port infrastructure and of all the Black Sea ports clearly demonstrates that it is a strategy: a strategy of economic strangulation. Ukraine cannot survive without Odessa and without access to the Black Sea. I am convinced that the capture of Odessa is almost certain. The only way to prevent Putin from deciding to take the city would be for there to be an agreement with the Western powers. This would require a treaty guaranteeing Russia’s security, the non-expansion of NATO, the non-stationing of foreign troops in Ukraine, and all sorts of other provisions. Given the attitude of the European Union’s leaders, this is highly unlikely. This therefore makes the capture of Odessa highly likely.
To understand this, one must take into account the psychological aspect of the situation, and recall a historical experience. In 2014, right after the Banderites staged a coup d’état during what is called the Maidan, many people in Odessa wanted the city to be reunited with Russia, just as in Crimea. This led to civil unrest. There were all sorts of protests. One of the most notorious episodes is the one in which the leaders of Odessa’s trade unions were locked by the Banderites inside a trade union building and burned alive, 72 people. There was no inquiry, no trial. Nothing. This heinous murder was covered up by the current authorities. I myself witnessed, at a memorial ceremony some years later, an old woman who was not afraid to carry a placard reading: “We will never forgive and we will never forget.” So yes, the capture of Odessa seems to me to be almost certain, given the way things are unfolding. The Russians admit that there are what they call Russian underground cells in Odessa, exactly as in 1942-43 during the German-Romanian occupation.
How do you explain that it took Russia so long to decide on this blockade, given that a significant share of the war matériel supplied by the West to Ukraine arrives by sea? What consequences will it have on the course of the war?
It took so long because Putin was hoping for a deal with Trump. Throughout the entire year 2025, he kept hoping. In a way, he partly achieved this with the so-called Anchorage Accords. According to the Russian interpretation of these accords, Trump had accepted the most important point, namely no Ukrainian membership in NATO, and no foreign troops or bases in Ukraine. In exchange for this, Putin was willing to make compromises. In particular, he was willing to limit his territorial demands to four provinces, plus Crimea, plus the demilitarization of Ukraine and denazification. His entire strategy consisted of finding a compromise and reaching an agreement with the Americans. So, in theory, if Trump had gone ahead with the implementation of the Anchorage Accords, this would have meant that Ukraine could have kept 80% of its territory – including Odessa – and retained a limited but real sovereignty. Now, all of this is null and void. The question is: why?
2026 was, for Putin, the year of disillusionment with Trump. From the Russian perspective, the developments of the past year showed that the United States was neither capable nor willing to enforce the agreements reached at Anchorage. Through a series of actions, Trump even made any agreement impossible.
The starting point was the Tomahawk incident, in the fall of 2025. When Zelensky requested them, Senator Graham supported the transfer of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine. According to reports, Putin allegedly called Trump and told him in no uncertain terms that this was unacceptable and that the consequences would be unpredictable. This warning killed the idea in the bud, but the incident was a first blow to the possibility of a negotiated settlement.
The second blow was an assassination attempt, or at the very least a drone attack, on Putin’s residence in Valdai. This was very, very important, because it convinced the Russians that the Americans were playing a double game, or that Trump did not control his security apparatus, and that he may not even have known that the Ukrainians, the CIA, or both, had attempted to strike Putin’s residence.
The third blow was the kidnapping of Maduro, the president of a country that falls within Russia’s strategic interests, in which Russia had invested and with which it had oil cooperation. Maduro’s kidnapping, devoid of any legal basis, was perceived in Russia for what it was: the sheer imperial seizure of a country and its resources, a country that maintained friendly economic ties with Russia.
And the fourth and final blow was the war against Iran, which is likewise a strategic partner of Russia. What was particularly odious was the way it was carried out: the decapitation of the state, through the assassination of its principal leaders, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic since 1989, and the killing of 165 schoolgirls aged 7 to 12. All of this created a very hostile reaction in Russia.
In such a context, any negotiation with the Americans appears to be a pure waste of time. This explains why, in July 2026, Russia took off the gloves. What could not be achieved through peaceful means will be achieved through military action. The Kremlin has begun an assault on the Ukrainian state as such.
In March, you also said that the war in Iran had “changed everything.” Could you clarify how this conflict is currently reshaping Russia’s calculus on Ukraine? Do you consider a fusion of the Ukrainian and Iranian theaters to be a scenario the Kremlin should fear? Does such a scenario seem possible to you?
Will there be a fusion of the two conflicts? This is a very important question, because yes, the war in Iran has indeed changed the calculus and the conduct of the Russian war in Ukraine, and the two wars are, in a certain sense, connected. It is important to stress, however, that Russia does not want a direct conflict with the United States. From that standpoint, Zelensky’s attempt to drag Iran — and therefore the United States — into the conflict by bombing Iranian assets in the Caspian Sea was very, very provocative. But I do not believe this will result in the fusion of the two conflicts into one large war, for a simple reason: Russia does not want it, neither does Iran, and the United States cannot afford it. Nobody wants this fusion, except Zelensky.
Iran has its own agenda, and it is certainly not going to let itself be distracted from it by getting involved in a war with Ukraine. As for the Russians, their priority is to defeat Ukraine on the theater of operations. Putin even said, in his recent speech to the Duma, that Russia should act more boldly, and strike harder, in order to achieve all the objectives of the special military operation.
A new stage has begun, which I called “the gloves come off” in one of my recent videos. Russia is now following Iran’s example and, since mid-July 2026, has been massively bombing Ukrainian industrial capacity and military installations. Hundreds of missiles and drones are launched almost every day.
Incidentally, this raises a simple question: who can today compete with such military might? Russia produces 120 ballistic missiles a month, according to Ukrainian sources; the United States produces about twenty… American stocks of Patriot missiles — interceptors — are nearly exhausted, their production cannot be rapidly increased, and their cost is exorbitant. Russia therefore produces in one month as many offensive missiles as the United States produces in a year, while the latter has run out of defensive missiles. This means that Russia currently holds a preponderance, if not an overwhelming dominance, in terms of strike capacity.
As for the United States, it appears in the eyes of the world as a paper tiger. They never would have thought that a day would come when their military power would be put to the test by Iran. This is a turning point: the United States cannot defeat Iran for lack of sufficient industrial capacity. They are proving unable to produce enough strike missiles. The reason for this limitation lies in the American cost of producing war matériel. It has been inflated for years, disproportionately to its real cost, for lack of competition, and because Congress has shown itself willing to pay exorbitant prices to arms manufacturers to obtain what they called “the best.” It turns out today that this “best” was simply the most expensive.
The Russians, for their part, produce faster, cheaper, and better. Only last week, a new Yasen-M class submarine was launched. It joins the four already in service. These are nuclear-powered submarines, invisible and silent, armed with Zircon hypersonic missiles, which to this day are unstoppable.
In purchasing power parity terms, Russia’s GDP today is comparable to that of Germany or Japan, whereas it looks markedly smaller in nominal terms — a gap that fuels two opposing readings of Russian economic power. Do you think Western strategists relied on nominal GDP — which understates Russia relative to the EU or the United States — to justify their bet on a rapid Russian collapse under the weight of sanctions, when reasoning in PPP terms, more relevant for assessing actual industrial and military output, should have alerted them to the country’s resilience? You yourself recently drew attention, in an interview with Lena Petrova, to another aspect of the problem, which strikes me as particularly illuminating: the question of debt and budget surpluses. Could you walk us through your analysis on that here?
At first glance, the European GDP is ten to fifteen times higher than that of Russia. But this is a very superficial comparison that does not reflect this reality: European economies are heavily indebted. The debt of the United Kingdom, France, and Italy exceeds or comes close to 100% of their GDP. Even Germany is indebted to the tune of 65% of its GDP. All these countries are continuing their trajectory of deindustrialization. Their economy relies essentially on services, whereas in Russia it relies on energy, industrial production, and military production. In terms of purchasing power parity, Russia holds fourth place in the world, ahead of Japan and Germany. In terms of military power, it holds first place in Europe.
This was confirmed yesterday by the speech of Mr. Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s former commander-in-chief and Zelensky’s rival. He stated that it would take NATO twelve years to reach even half of Russia’s military capacity.
Considering the EU’s nominal GDP as a whole doesn’t actually make much sense, because if one looks country by country at who is willing and able to fight Russia, one finds the following: the United Kingdom would be willing, but it is not capable. Its army is in a pitiful state. The country resembles a retired boxer who still dreams of being champion. France would be willing, but it isn’t capable either, due to its budget deficit, the urgent reconstruction expenses it will have to bear because of the recent fires (5 to 10 billion euros, depending on the calculation method), its industrial decline, and next year’s presidential elections.
Germany would be capable, but it isn’t willing. Militarily, it is not currently in the same category as the other great powers, and it is aware of this. The question could be posed differently in a few years if its rearmament proves successful. Poland would be capable, but it isn’t willing either. Despite a considerable expansion of its military spending (nearly 5% of GDP), it would not risk a conflict with Belarus, let alone with Russia, which, besides having a highly uncertain outcome, would take place on its own borders.
As for the Finns, the Baltic states, the Swedes, and the Danes, they would be more than willing, but they are frankly incapable! I once made a comparison between the combined military resources of the Baltic and Nordic countries and those of Russia, taking into account only the North-Western military districts of Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg, and Murmansk. Even so, the result was an overwhelming preponderance of Russia.
Finally, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and the other European countries, are neither willing nor capable of confronting Russia militarily.
In summary, the EU has neither money, nor troops, nor weapons, nor unity, nor purpose. Some of its leaders say they want to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia? But to accomplish what? So that Ukraine can recover lost territories populated by millions of Russian-speakers who are fighting against it today? Who would voluntarily sign up to embark on such a project?
By recently adopting a 23rd package of sanctions, European policymakers do not appear to have revised their position on the usefulness of sanctions in forcing Russia to the negotiating table. How do you explain what increasingly looks like a denial of reality?
The latest EU sanctions package showed that there was no unity. Greece said no, Bulgaria said no, Slovakia and Hungary were reluctant. In the end, everyone’s arm had to be twisted to get it passed. The EU is hurting itself just as much as it is hurting Russia. Driven by blind hatred, its leaders are digging in on an economically self-destructive path.
The relative failure of the sanctions, the massive indebtedness of the Europeans that leaves them no room for maneuver, the total lack of military experience, the absence of hypersonic missiles, and so on — all of this means, in practical terms, that Europe is absolutely not ready to confront Russia. But when no desired outcome is in sight, people tend to deny reality. This is a common psychological response. For a politician, admitting failure is impossible. So they dig in, which will make the eventual collapse of their policy even more painful…
Today, Russia holds all the cards to end the war in Ukraine with a total victory.