Ambassador Clyde Kull is a senior advisor in public policy and former diplomat with three decades of broad experience in policy making. He has served as Estonian ambassador to France, Germany, EU, NATO, WTO and the OECD. He also held senior government official positions as Undersecretary for Political Affairs as well as for Foreign Economic Policy and Trade. He was chief negotiator for Estonia’s WTO accession.
Maria Kuznetsova, Guillaume de Sardes: As a former Estonian ambassador to NATO, do you think NATO will fall behind the US regardless of the latter’s position on Russia, or do you think that crossing what appear to be red lines for Europeans could lead to a deep crisis between alliance members? What could the consequences be?
Clyde Kull: There are quite a number of elements in this one question. First of all, I think that the new administration’s position on Russia is always dependent on the situation on the ground and internationally. And we also see some development here. So if you’re looking at the latest Trump’s comments, they have also been more cautious and there is some re-evaluation of the attitude to the Russian position as to the Ukrainian war and peace is concerned, compared to what we saw three months ago. So, I would actually keep the US-Russia relationship a bit aside and then as to NATO itself.
I think that NATO has shown during those turbulent last three months that it is still solid and united. The US commitment to NATO has not changed. They have also confirmed this commitment several times. Of course, we also have to keep in mind the basics of NATO. It is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which means that it stands on two pillars: the European pillar and the American pillar (the United States, but also Canada and Australia). So if there are doubts about the U.S. commitments in NATO, it is very difficult to see the organization in its present form to continue. It is, of course, always the black scenario. Therefore, I wouldn’t go into this speculation at the moment. I think that all the members of NATO are aware of this risk and aware that any doubts about commitment to NATO directly impact the fate and the existence of the organization itself. To summarise, I would say that for the moment NATO member states are firmly committed to keeping the organisation as it is.
How would you assess NATO’s red lines in the Ukrainian conflict? Do you think, for example, that the capture of Odessa, which would cut off Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea, would lead to military engagement?
Well, it is a very hypothetical question at the moment. NATO defends the general values of democracy and international law and assesses the risks at its borders. When war breaks out on NATO’s borders, it is very carefully assessed. However, the new US administration has made it very clear that NATO intends to stick to its own commitments. These are Article 5 and territorial responsibilities towards alliance members. As Ukraine is not one of these members, NATO’s responsibilities and commitments do not apply to it. So I don’t think that territorial gains made by either side would have much impact on NATO’s operational actions. On the other hand – and this has been expressed by both the Biden and Trump administrations – the use of weapons of mass destruction is a red line. Crossing it would probably lead to a reassessment of NATO’s position, because the consequences of such use would be severe.
Article 5
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”
As you mentioned, Ukraine is not now a member of NATO and it seems certain that Ukraine will not join NATO, at least not in the near future. Do you think that other security guarantees could be given to Ukraine?
There have been a lot of discussions now among the Europeans about the security guarantees. In fact, if you recall the negotiations that began shortly after Russia’s last invasion, the talks held in Istanbul stalled precisely over the issue of security guarantees. Well, the security guarantees are always a very difficult question because they can change, their optics can change depending on the situation and they are never absolute. We can also recall that Ukraine actually had certain guarantees under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. The parties promised that if Ukraine gives up the nuclear weapons, any interference into its sovereignty will be defended by the parties. In practice, this commitment was not respected. The safety guarantees given by third parties therefore give rise to legitimate doubts… I would say that any security guarantees without serious US involvement will be very fragile. We have also seen that there have been quite a number of questions and doubts about deploying some Western troops on Ukrainian soil. In other words, the commitment of the United States is necessary for the credibility of any deployment of peacekeeping troops. I would go even further: in my opinion, effective American economic involvement and interest in Ukraine, through the Minerals Deal, would be far more valuable than the presence of European peacekeeping troops without American soldiers on Ukrainian soil.
Our next question will be exactly about the Minerals Deal. Estonia plans to increase its defense spending to at least 5% of GDP starting in 2026, a significant rise from the current 3.43%. Estonia has been a leading supporter of Ukraine in terms of percentage of GDP, providing significant military aid, including artillery shells and defense equipment. Meanwhile, the US leads in aid to Ukraine in absolute terms, but these amounts are less than 1% of GDP. How do you feel when the U.S. is signing a Minerals Deal with Ukraine, even though their financial aid to Ukraine is not as tangible to their budget if we compare it to Estonia?
I agree with the mathematics and you are also right to underline that there is a difference between the percentage and absolute terms. In absolute terms it is unquestionable that one of the biggest countries alone to support Ukraine is the US. There is also the question of not how much money you spend but how you spend. And from this point of view the US contribution has been invaluable. As now, to translate it into a certain kind of moral right of participating in reconstruction of Ukraine and what will be the share of each one of another country, that’s another matter…
So, before I will go to the issue of the Minerals deal and the reconstruction of Ukraine, I would like to focus on defence spending. While it has been clear that the Europeans share in common defense has been quite modest compared to the Americans and therefore the demands of the US side already from the time of the US previous administrations have been justified. The war in Ukraine forces European countries to recognize this reality. Increased defense spending is essential not only to strengthen NATO’s overall capabilities but also to develop each nation’s own military potential. For example, Estonia is planning to allocate 5% of its GDP to defense, based on a careful assessment of our national needs—particularly in critical areas such as air defense and others. So, it is not so much related to the assistance to Ukraine, which is separate from defence spending. Therefore, it gives to Estonia a certain moral right to have our word in NATO decisions. Returning to the subject of reconstruction, however, I don’t believe that our financial commitment gives us priority over other countries when it comes to winning contracts for the future reconstruction of Ukraine. In my opinion, the criteria should be the capacity of the various countries to participate in this reconstruction. The United States likely has the greatest potential to contribute to Ukraine’s reconstruction, given its size and economic capacity. While we expect every European country to participate, the contributions from smaller nations—such as Estonia, Slovenia, and others—will naturally be more limited in scale.
Now, as to the Minerals deal, I think that there are still a lot of questions about the concrete aspects of that. Nevertheless, it is quite important that there is the U.S. direct involvement in the economic interests of Ukraine, in Ukrainians’ future and in its sovereignty. Therefore, it is a certain soft guarantee for Ukraine.
Do you think that NATO, in its current structure, is resilient enough to cope with both the threat of Russian aggression and internal divisions? Countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, and Turkey, in particular, are more accommodating towards Russia than other members of the Alliance.
It is true that there are different assessments within NATO about Russia. The countries that you mentioned have closer links with Russia but one has to look behind the reasons for that. Hungary and Slovakia, also Turkey, have been quite dependent on Russian energy, mostly gas. Therefore there are very strong economic imperatives behind those links. Regarding threat assessment, I would say there has been strong unanimity within NATO discussions on these issues. While there may be some nuances in national risk assessments, they haven’t had any serious effect on the alliance’s overall posture. Even countries geographically further from Russia—such as Spain, Portugal, and Italy—recognize that NATO’s threat landscape is broader. Russia is one aspect, but there are others, such as terrorism, radical Islamist movements, and other serious global risks. Therefore, I would say that for the moment, Russia has not had any big impact on NATO’s present.
As we speak, Russian railway lines are being built along the borders with Finland and Norway, as well as south of St. Petersburg to the Estonian border. Existing railway lines are being extended. Military experts in Russia characterise the activity along the Finnish border (1340 km) as part of the Kremlin’s preparations for a potential conflict with NATO. Finland, which was previously neutral, joined the alliance in 2023. There is a view that Russia could try to test NATO’s cohesion by invading a small country within the alliance, such as Estonia, where many Russians live. What is your opinion on this?
We are carefully following any developments at the Russian territory, particularly at our borders. If there are developments in the infrastructure sector, which you have mentioned, of course, one has to look at the purposes. We know that the routes and the railways have always dual use. They have civilian purposes, but they can always be used for military purposes. However, we cannot at this moment bring any direct connection between any infrastructure development at the Russian territory immediately to any military threats. The military experts, at least in Estonia, are of the opinion that there are no immediate military threats from Russia’s side to Estonia.
Some Western strategists privately admit that in the event of a full-scale Russian attack, the Baltic States could become a “sacrificial zone” — buying time for NATO to mobilize elsewhere. Does Estonia trust that NATO would actually risk escalation to nuclear levels to defend Narva, for example, or is there an unspoken understanding that Estonia must be prepared to fight alone, at least initially?
This is a question regarding military theory—specifically the concept of deterrence. The essence of deterrence is to have the potential preparation and commitments on the level that always would deter the adversary from taking any first actions. Therefore, I think that the most important deterrence is NATO’s Article 5. Of course, there might be speculation if one wants to test that or not. It is like playing chess, when you are making the first move, you always calculate the second, third and the fourth moves already. There can be speculations whether one side might attempt to test the other by making a move. However, I think that at least in Estonia, we have this strong belief in NATO’s commitments to Article 5. We also expect that it is acknowledged on another side. To summarise, it seems highly unlikely to me that Russia would try to test NATO’s Article 5. The consequences could be very unpredictable and very destructive for either side. Therefore we have to be vigilant and be ready to strengthen and maintain NATO’s capacities, so that there will be no such idea or attempt to test the resolve of the alliance’s members.
