Today, 15 August 2025, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin will meet in Alaska. Far from being a simple tête-à-tête on Ukraine, this summit is part of a much broader confrontation: the one between NATO and Russia, fought through proxy actors. It is precisely this systemic nature of the conflict that makes the exercise both relevant in form and, most likely, doomed to failure.
A format justified by the nature of the conflict
In a proxy war, only the major powers can decide the outcome of the conflict. The fact that Zelensky and the Europeans are excluded from the discussions does not change the nature of the dialogue: it must take place between the two belligerents — Washington and Moscow — who control the flow of arms, sanctions and the overall military posture. This reduced format avoids the pitfall of negotiations where secondary players blur the lines.
The central issue: security architecture in Europe
A major sticking point lies in how each side views the post-Cold War security order. For Russia, NATO’s continued expansion eastward is not just a theoretical concern: it is an existential threat, confirmed by the memory of military interventions carried out by the Alliance since the 1990s — from the air campaign against Serbia in 1999 to the invasion of Libya in 2011, via the prolonged intervention in Afghanistan. These operations show that NATO is not a purely defensive alliance, but a political-military bloc capable of projecting its power beyond its borders and overthrowing regimes.
Western countries, for their part, claim to defend the sovereign right of each country to choose its alliances. In doing so, they disregard a principle enshrined in several international declarations, namely that of indivisible security, according to which no state or group of states should strengthen its security at the expense of another. By insisting on NATO enlargement without taking this concept into account, the West is imposing a framework in which the security of some is built on the insecurity of others.
In this context, Donald Trump seems to be approaching the negotiations from too narrow a perspective: that of front lines and possible territorial exchanges between Moscow and Kiev. Such an approach reduces the war to a cartographic problem and obscures its structural dimensions: the European security architecture, NATO’s posture and expansion, legally binding guarantees, arms control and the lasting neutrality of certain states. In the eyes of the Russians, these are the root causes of the conflict and cannot be ignored.
Incompatible positions
Even on the limited issue of a ceasefire, Russian and Western positions appear irreconcilable. Moscow would only accept a truce if the Ukrainian army withdrew from the parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts that have not yet been conquered. For the Kremlin, these territories are now part of the Russian state and cannot be subject to any territorial negotiations. Western capitals, on the other hand, consider these areas to be illegally occupied. A ceasefire could only be envisaged on the front line, without Ukrainian withdrawal. Thus, even what might seem to be the simplest step in an agreement — a temporary halt to hostilities — becomes in reality a diplomatic battlefield where each side sees the other’s conditions as a disguised surrender. As long as this divergence persists, even a humanitarian pause seems out of reach.
A structural deficit of trust
Years of sanctions, counter-sanctions, diplomatic ruptures and communication wars have eroded mutual trust. Each side suspects the other of using dialogue only to buy time or strengthen its position. This mistrust is reinforced by the precedent of the Minsk II agreements, signed in 2015 to end hostilities in Donbass. Presented at the time as a roadmap to a negotiated peace, these agreements provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and constitutional reform guaranteeing special status for the regions concerned. However, no serious effort was made by the West to compel Kiev to implement the key provisions, while several European leaders subsequently acknowledged that these texts had served to ‘buy time’ to arm Ukraine and strengthen its military capabilities. For Moscow, this episode illustrates the relative value of the commitments made by the West.
The logic of the ‘zero-sum game’
The two powers approach the summit with the idea that any gain for the other is a loss for themselves. This view, typical of rivalries between major powers, makes the search for a genuine compromise extremely difficult: any concession is perceived not as an investment in stability, but as a strategic retreat.
The absence of a credible monitoring mechanism
A successful summit is not measured solely by the outcome of the initial talks, but by the establishment of working groups, timetables and mutual checks and balances. Here, no such measures have been announced. Without structure, the meeting risks remaining an isolated event, without any concrete results.
A closed international context
Alliances have tightened: NATO has strengthened its ranks, while Russia has consolidated its ties with China, Iran and North Korea to reduce its dependence on the West. Within this bloc logic, any bilateral progress between Washington and Moscow would be perceived by many European countries not as a step towards peace, but as a threat to their influence and perceived security. Fearing that an American-Russian compromise would be made at their expense — for example, by accepting Ukraine’s neutrality or limiting NATO’s future expansion — certain capitals will do everything in their power to prevent such an agreement. For these states, it is better to prolong the confrontation than to risk a strategic realignment negotiated over their heads. This dynamic is echoed in Washington itself: within what is known as the American ‘deep state’ — permanent networks of senior civil servants, security officials and influential decision-makers — the prevailing view is that lasting peace with Russia would weaken the justification for American imperium in Europe and reduce their ability to contain Russian influence on the continent. In this logic, any strategic rapprochement is seen not as a welcome stabilisation, but as a direct threat to the overall American position.
In short, while the Alaska summit provides a direct channel between two key players in the crisis, deep divisions, the logic of power interests and the lack of instruments to translate a gesture into sustainable policy mean that it is likely to end in failure. It may be a visually powerful moment, but it is unlikely to be a strategic turning point. Unfortunately, the outcome of the war is likely to be decided on the battlefield.
