On December 8, 2024, the regime of Bashar al-Assad fell in Syria. By that time, the civil war had been going on for more than ten years. The country was devastated, society was fragmented, and power was effectively divided among dozens of armed groups. The new authorities faced an almost impossible task: to halt the disintegration of the state and rebuild Syria anew. One year has passed. This is not enough to speak of success, but it is enough to draw the first conclusions and to ask whether life in Syria has actually become better.
Many different forces contributed to Assad’s overthrow, but from the very beginning it was clear that the decisive role was played by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, previously known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. The key question was whether the revolution would lead to a new spiral of chaos, or whether al-Sharaa and his entourage would be able to ensure at least a degree of relative stability.
Closely linked to this was a second, no less important question: what kind of Syria they intended to build. One option was an authoritarian state relying on the Arab Sunni majority, which makes up around 70 percent of the population. The other was a more inclusive model that would, at least formally, take into account the interests of Kurds, Druze, Alawites, and Christians. The third question concerned the role of Islam. HTS is a Salafi Islamist organization, and al-Sharaa himself emerged from the milieu of al-Qaeda. For many Syrians and external observers, it remained unclear whether Islam would become the ideological foundation of the new regime or be pushed into the background.
An instrument for holding the country together
In January 2025, al-Sharaa was proclaimed interim president. Formally, this was presented as a transitional arrangement, but in practice it granted him almost unlimited powers. By spring, a temporary constitution with a five-year term had been adopted. Syria became a presidential republic in which the president directly appoints the government; parliament is formed not through universal elections but through councils of elders and presidential quotas; and genuine popular representation is absent.
Nevertheless, over the course of the year Damascus managed to avoid a new full-scale war. This is a minimal, but important result.
Three problematic communities: Kurds, Alawites, Druze
The Kurdish question remains a key challenge to Syria’s territorial integrity. The Kurds demand autonomy and the preservation of their own armed forces, while al-Sharaa insists on a single army and a unified state. Negotiations continued throughout the year, interspersed with fighting. Only in November 2025, with U.S. mediation, was a ceasefire agreement reached providing for the integration of Kurdish forces into the Syrian army while preserving their internal structure. This is not the first such agreement.
The Alawites are associated with the former regime but lack their own military protection. In the spring of 2025, an uprising by former Assad-era officers in Latakia and Tartus was brutally suppressed, followed by mass reprisals, pogroms, and ethnic violence. Al-Sharaa was forced to acknowledge that the state does not fully control the use of force. A commission was established and investigations were launched, but for the Alawites the “new Syria” is still associated primarily with fear.
The Druze have their own militia and external backing in the form of Israel. Attempts by Damascus to strengthen control over the south of the country led to direct clashes, Israeli airstrikes, and the preservation of Suwayda’s de facto autonomy. The status quo was maintained, but the conflict was not resolved. Central authority in this region remains limited.
Foreign Policy
Al-Sharaa has proven to be a very active diplomat. He is building relations along several directions at once: with Turkey as a key regional partner; with the Arab monarchies as a source of funding and legitimacy; with the West as a potential investor and a guarantor of sanctions relief; and with Russia, which retains its military bases in exchange for recognizing the new authorities.
The main threat from within
The most dangerous challenge for the new regime comes from its own social base. Radical Islamists who brought al-Sharaa to power are increasingly accusing him of “betraying jihad,” excessive moderation, and flirting with the West. It is they, armed and ideologically motivated, who pose the real threat to his rule. Neither the Kurds, nor Israel, nor the Alawites are capable of overthrowing him. Salafi radicals, however, are. The historical irony is that the Assad regime once followed a similar path (secular rhetoric, an emphasis on stability, and the suppression of radicals) and its main enemies were also Islamists.
One year on, it can be said that Syria’s future will be determined by whether al-Sharaa manages to suppress the radicals, integrate the country’s communities, and preserve state sovereignty.
