The protests that erupted in Iran at the end of 2025 are increasingly being compared to the 1979 revolution, which ended the monarchy and brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power. At the time, the country radically changed its political course, transforming into an Islamic republic. Today, public discourse is once again filled with discussions about a possible regime change and even a return to monarchy. However, as Narges Bajoghli, associate professor of Middle Eastern studies at Johns Hopkins University and author of a book on Iran’s contemporary power system, points out, these historical parallels are misleading. In her article for Time magazine, she explains why the current protests fundamentally differ from events nearly half a century ago and why it will be far more difficult for demonstrators to prevail.
The unrest began with a strike by merchants at Tehran’s Grand Bazaar in late December. They refused to open their shops in protest against soaring prices, inflation, and the collapse of the national currency. Soon after, street demonstrations spread to other cities. Authorities responded with internet shutdowns, mass arrests, and brutal repression. The confrontation has now lasted for three weeks: while the intensity of the protests is gradually declining, the violence of the crackdown continues to increase.
Today, as in 1979, Iranians are outraged by economic hardship and political rigidity. However, Bajoghli emphasizes that the revolution back then succeeded not because of the scale of public anger, but because nearly all key segments of society united against the shah. Clergy, merchants, students, workers, and parts of the elite acted in coordination, exerting pressure the regime could not withstand. Today, such unity is absent.
One of the main differences lies in the lack of a figure capable of becoming a national leader of the protest movement. That role is being claimed by Reza Pahlavi, son of the last shah, who lives in the United States. However, he has not returned to Iran since his youth, lacks organized structures inside the country, and enjoys limited support. Moreover, key international players show no willingness to seriously back him. Monarchist slogans heard in the streets reflect desperation and a search for a way out of the impasse rather than a genuine demand for the restoration of Pahlavi rule.
The situation within the clergy has also changed dramatically. In 1979, the majority of Shiite clerics rallied around Khomeini and presented a united front against the shah. Today, Iran’s clergy is far from monolithic. Shiism is historically decentralized, with competing factions within the religious elite, and there is no consensus comparable to that of 1979. At the same time, no influential religious group has openly supported the protests.
The status of the bazaar, which played an important role in the late 1970s revolution, has also evolved. At the time, merchants enjoyed significant financial independence and could afford open confrontation with the authorities. Over the years of the Islamic Republic, and especially under sanctions, the economy has increasingly come under the control of structures linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. These networks have taken over imports, currency operations, and access to key goods. Traditional businesses are forced to cooperate with them and have effectively been absorbed into the system. Today’s bazaar no longer constitutes an autonomous force capable of becoming the engine of a revolution and is, in reality, part of the very structure against which the streets are protesting.
According to Bajoghli, however, the decisive factor remains the behavior of the security apparatus. In 1979, the turning point came when the army and police began refusing to shoot at demonstrators, while some units defected to the opposition. This accelerated the fall of the monarchy. Today, nothing of the sort is happening. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is not only a military force but also an economic and political powerhouse deeply invested in the survival of the Islamic Republic. The few reports emerging from Iran amid internet blackouts indicate that security forces are brutally suppressing protests rather than joining them. No signs of a split within the army or security services are visible and without such a fracture, no revolution can succeed.
Bajoghli also criticizes the role of the West. In her view, attempts by the United States and Israel to exploit Iranian protests for geopolitical purposes only harm genuine prospects for change. When Western officials publicly speak about restoring the monarchy, they discredit authentic opposition forces and reinforce Tehran’s propaganda narrative about “foreign interference.” Likewise, open support for protests from American officials or Israeli intelligence services puts dissidents inside the country at risk, turning them into ideal targets for repression.
Iranians, the scholar stresses, deserve better than having their grievances turned into tools of foreign geopolitical games. They need clear-eyed support for real change, not illusions presented as reality. For now, the system of the Islamic Republic remains institutionally strong, controls the economy, and monopolizes the use of force. Unlike in 1979, the authorities are not losing the support of elites or the military, making the chances of a revolutionary scenario extremely slim.
