Not so long ago, the United States was offering a reward for Ahmed al-Sharaa’s head. Today, he is meeting with Donald Trump and the Emir of Qatar, leading the country, being recognised by the West – and could become one of the most influential Islamic politicians of our time. How did a militant become a figure acceptable to Washington, Ankara and Moscow?
Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), came to power in Syria at the end of 2024. He was leading the overthrow of long-time dictator Bashar al-Assad. The development was not expected in the Syrian war, where everybody was used to Assad, backed by Iran and Russia. The HTS victory was not only a military but also a geopolitical shock: Islamists with a terrorist past (and without the slightest sign of democratic legitimacy) came to power in Damascus.
However, as early as January 2025, the Emir of Qatar flew to Syria, and in February al-Sharaa himself travelled to Saudi Arabia. After that, to Turkey. An intensive diplomatic tour began, during which the new authorities enlisted the support of regional countries. Even Moscow, Assad’s former key ally, began to build relations with the new government, although Assad himself found refuge in Russia. The Kremlin changed the flag over the Syrian embassy and started a direct dialogue with the HTS – for the sake of preserving military bases and influence in the region.
What was most surprising was the U.S. and EU reversal. They hesitated for a long time: HTS is former allies of ISIS and Al-Qaeda. However, in the spring of 2025, a rapid revision of the approach began. Germany was the first to return the embassy to Damascus. In May, Donald Trump met with al-Sharaa in Saudi Arabia and announced the lifting of sanctions. Following the US, the European Union began taking similar measures.
What has changed? First, al-Sharaa stopped broadcasting radical slogans and began to speak the language of compromise. He does not call Israel a ‘Zionist entity’, demonstrates readiness for coexistence with the West and supports the balance between Ankara, Riyadh and Moscow. Secondly, for the US and the EU, the new regime is a chance to push Iran and even Russia out of Syrian territory. Although Moscow is maintaining military facilities for now, Damascus has already ordered banknote printing in the UAE and Germany rather than Russia, symbolic and disturbing for the Kremlin.
Despite foreign policy successes, inside Syria the new government controls only part of the territory, the economy is devastated and ethno-religious conflicts are flaring up with renewed vigour. In March, there was an Alawite uprising in Latakia, brutally suppressed with 1,500 victimes. In April, clashes with the Druze began. Their spiritual leader has already called on the international community to introduce troops into Syria. In parallel, the socio-economic situation is worsening. Since 2010, the Syrian economy has lost 85% of GDP. Russia has stopped supplying grain, Iran – fuel. The salary of a civil servant in 2025 does not exceed $20. Under these conditions, any spark can reignite the civil war.
Western countries realise this. The US, despite the lifting of sanctions, is in no hurry to open an embassy in Damascus. Nevertheless, for the West, al-Sharaa can be a deterrent to Iran and Russia. For Turkey, a partner in securing its interests in northern Syria. For the Gulf states, a chance to consolidate Sunni influence. Even Israel does not rule out normalisation. However, even international recognition is no guarantee of a long and peaceful life for the new Syria.
