As early as tomorrow, the world may wake up in a far more dangerous reality. On February 5, 2026, the New START (SNV-III) treaty expires — the last remaining agreement limiting the strategic nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States and ensuring mutual transparency between the two powers. If it is not extended, even temporarily, the world’s two largest nuclear states will, for the first time in half a century, find themselves outside any formal framework governing their strategic forces.
What is New START and why it mattered
New START — the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms — marked the culmination of a long series of agreements inherited from the Cold War and the post-bipolar era. It was signed in 2010 by Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama amid a brief period of political rapprochement between Moscow and Washington.
The treaty set strict ceilings:
- up to 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers;
- up to 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers;
- up to 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed strategic delivery systems.
While the document imposed hard limits on launchers and warheads, its true value lay not so much in the numbers as in the verification mechanisms: on-site inspections, data exchanges, and notification systems. For decades, these instruments reduced the risk of misinterpretation and sudden escalation.
How trust was broken
After the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine, relations between Russia and the United States deteriorated irreversibly. As early as February 2022, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia’s nuclear forces had been placed on heightened combat alert. In 2023, Moscow declared a “suspension” of its participation in New START, while stressing that this did not constitute a formal withdrawal from the treaty.
In practice, however, the agreement ceased to fulfill its primary function: ensuring transparency. Inspections were halted, and data exchanges frozen. The United States acknowledged that Russia continued to observe the quantitative limits, but in the absence of verification, this confidence was political rather than technical.
An attempt to preserve the status quo
In the autumn of 2025, Putin proposed a compromise: extending the terms of New START for one year, subject to reciprocal guarantees. He described a complete abandonment of nuclear arms control as a strategic and dangerous mistake. The Kremlin repeatedly confirmed that this proposal remains on the table.
Nevertheless, no clear response came from Washington. In January 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump described the idea of an extension as “not a bad one,” while making it clear that there would be no automatic renewal. His administration argues that a strictly bilateral format no longer reflects the real balance of power.
The U.S. position: the China factor and strategic uncertainty
The main reason for American caution is China. Unlike Russia and the United States, Beijing has never participated in strategic arms control agreements and is steadily expanding its nuclear capabilities. According to Pentagon estimates, China’s arsenal could exceed 1,000 warheads by the end of the decade.
For Washington, this creates a strategic dilemma: maintain restrictions with Moscow while confronting the rise of a third nuclear power, or abandon the treaty framework altogether and prepare for a trilateral confrontation without rules. The Trump team appears to be leaning toward the latter option.
Why the absence of a treaty is more dangerous than the arms race itself
The paradox of the situation is that neither Russia nor the United States has an objective interest in a large-scale strategic arms race. Strategic parity has already been achieved, and a rapid expansion of arsenals would require enormous financial and technological resources.
The absence of a treaty, however, creates a different threat, the threat of uncertainty. Without inspections and notifications, each side is forced to assume the worst about the other’s intentions. Any movement of delivery systems, any modernization of missiles or bombers, may be interpreted as preparation for escalation.
New weapons, new risks
The situation is further complicated by the emergence of systems not covered by New START. Russia is developing weapons such as “Poseidon” and “Burevestnik,” while the United States is betting on global missile defense and advanced strike technologies. The boundary between nuclear and non-nuclear strategic weapons is becoming increasingly blurred.
Under these conditions, any new agreement would require not only complex technical solutions, but also a level of political trust that is currently absent.
What comes next?
The likelihood of concluding a genuine New START-4 agreement in the foreseeable future is low. Even a short-term extension of New START would have limited impact if inspections and data exchanges are not restored.
