Former Russian ambassador to Colombia, Ednan Agaev has held senior positions in the Soviet and Russian Foreign Ministries, as well as at the United Nations. Based in Paris, he is now a consultant in international affairs.
Guillaume de Sardes: It has now been almost a month since February 28, 2026, when Israel and the United States launched a war against Iran. Clearly, it is not going as well as planned. Despite the decapitation strikes and massive bombardments, Iran is not giving in and – even if they are difficult to assess – it retains missile and drone capabilities that have allowed it to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world’s oil transits, or approximately 20 million barrels per day. Should we fear an oil shock comparable to those of 1973 or 2008? Which countries would be most affected?
Ednan Agaev: You are right. Apparently, the war is not going at all as Trump had planned. Despite his declarations that everything is going wonderfully and that Iran’s retaliatory potential has already been destroyed several times over, the Iranians stubbornly continue to strike targets in Israel and in the Gulf countries. With the same stubbornness, Iran is blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Yet, despite this unexpected situation – at least for Mr. Trump – we are still far from the oil shock of 1973 or the financial crisis of 2008, which saw the price of oil peak at 147 dollars a barrel (equivalent to more than 200 dollars in today’s money). Fortunately, there are other production sites around the world. The United States itself is the world’s leading oil producer. There are also countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, Angola, Venezuela, and Norway, not to mention smaller producers like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which are not affected by this conflict. In other words, the risk for the United States and Europe – that is, for the Western world – is not that high. The situation is, however, worrying for Asia, particularly for China, Pakistan, and India, which were the main buyers of Iranian oil. One can clearly see Mr. Trump’s cynicism when he invites the Chinese to deploy more effort and energy to unblock the Strait of Hormuz…
In retaliation for the Israeli bombing of the South Pars gas field, the Iranians struck the Ras Laffan site in Qatar, the world’s largest LNG platform. On top of this damage, which will require months of repairs, comes the disruption of liquefied natural gas traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — through which approximately 25% of global LNG flows transit, including a major share of Qatar’s exports (75 to 80 million tonnes per year, of which around 20 to 25% is destined for Europe). Do you think the energy security of the European Union is under threat, especially given that it has reduced the share of Russian gas in its imports from 40% in 2021 to around 10% today? To what extent would substitute capacities (American LNG and Norwegian gas) be sufficient to absorb a major supply shock?
The situation for gas is much the same as for oil. The hardest hit are Asian buyers. The Americans and the Europeans – the Westerners – are faring better. Europe has managed to diversify its suppliers. That is why I see no real threat to the energy sector of the European Union. The economy has adapted to the cut-off of Russian gas, which constituted a genuine shock in 2022-2023. By comparison, the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz is less severe. As evidence of this, European Union leaders recently stated that they had no intention of resuming purchases of Russian gas. If the situation were truly desperate, their approach would certainly be different… The big winners are the United States, as Europe will have to import even more American LNG. This is yet another success for American energy expansionism.
In this precarious context for the European economy, the Prime Minister of Belgium, Mr. Bart De Wever, declared on March 14, 2026, in an interview with the Belgian daily L’Écho : “We must normalise relations with Russia and regain access to cheap energy.” This position is far from commanding consensus. Do you think that the European Union, in the event of a serious energy crisis, might nonetheless seek to reconnect to Russian gas? Do you think the Kremlin would agree, given that on March 4, Vladimir Putin suggested that, rather than endure the European embargo (end of gas purchases by end of 2027), Russia could redirect these volumes to other, more profitable markets right now?
The declaration of the Belgian Prime Minister, just like those of the French President, is a matter of common sense. The European Union – and indeed all of Europe, including non-EU members such as the United Kingdom – must not remain cut off from Russia, behind a new iron curtain. Why should Washington be able to maintain a fairly intense dialogue with Moscow, while European capitals cannot? Europe shares the same geography, the same history, and the same culture as Russia. It must not allow the United States to be the sole mediator between Russia and Ukraine. The war that has been taking place for four years on its territory concerns Europe far more directly. Europe must absolutely be more active in seeking a solution acceptable to all parties. It must return to diplomacy.
But one must not confuse the need for dialogue with the resumption of gas purchases… As I have already told you, the European situation is not so dire. It is difficult, but not critical. Today, I see no serious signal of European interest in reconnecting to Russian gas. As for President Putin’s declaration that Russia could halt all gas exports to Europe right now, this is more a recognition of reality than a threat. The European market is closing to Russia as it opens up to American LNG. This reality was moreover recently acknowledged by Sergey Lavrov. In an interview on February 19 on the Al Arabiya channel, he noted with bitterness that the United States was attempting to push Russia out of global energy markets.
Do you think that this strain on European energy supplies could lead the European Union to revive pipeline projects such as Nabucco, which was abandoned around 2013? What routes might they follow? Which industrial players would have the capacity to carry them forward?
That is an interesting question. Europe should have taken serious steps long ago to diversify its gas imports. The current situation with Russian gas is a case of entirely unforeseen force majeure. That is why Europe was forced to act in haste, which is never the best way to proceed. But can we be guaranteed that tomorrow the situation will not be similar with American LNG exports? Is the attitude of the United States towards Europe not already a cause for concern? In this context, it would therefore not be reasonable to replace dependence on Russian gas with dependence on American LNG.
You mentioned the Nabucco project. At the time, this project was not pursued, precisely because of the enthusiasm of Europeans – and of Germany in particular – for purchasing Russian gas at a very favourable price. I hope that European leaders have drawn the lesson from this. It would be wise to invest in pipeline projects such as Nabucco, in order to diversify supply sources and ensure the stability and energy security of Europe.
The possibilities are numerous. One could start with Azerbaijani gas, which was to be transported via the Nabucco project. There are also significant gas fields in Iraq, resources in North Africa, as well as a project recently launched in Mozambique. And who knows — if Trump ever manages to transform the situation in Iran, there could also be Iranian gas.
The United States launched – or at least accompanied – this war without taking into account the interests of their Arab allies, and without even being in a position to ensure their security. In the United Arab Emirates, for example, Dubai International Airport and Amazon data centres were damaged by drone strikes; in Qatar, the Ras Laffan site, which we have already discussed, was severely damaged; in Bahrain, a desalination plant was hit; and so on. There are already dozens of dead and wounded. Could the American failure that is taking shape lead to a lasting reconfiguration of alliances in the Gulf?
The answer is fairly straightforward. Can one really cite a single case where the United States took into account the interests of their allies? I am speaking here of the period following the Second World War. The dominant philosophy of the United States is that of “America first.” Today, with the proponents of the MAGA slogan, the “virtue of selfishness” has become a norm in American political practice.
Despite this selfishness, have Washington’s allies ever attempted to create alternative alliances? Perhaps I am unaware of certain facts, or have forgotten some, but no example comes to mind. The United States is convinced that Arab countries, like Europe for that matter, feel sufficiently comfortable in their dependence on them to never turn their backs on them, even if the alliances are unbalanced.
Everyone knows full well that Uncle Sam is not the “good Samaritan.” In reality, no one expects Washington to take into account the concerns of its allies… That is why I am convinced that relations between the United States and the Gulf countries will remain, in essence, of the same nature.
