Donald Trump is once again restating his position: Europe’s security is прежде всего a European responsibility. In his view, the United States has for too long borne the main burden of defending its allies, while European countries have benefited from American security guarantees without paying their full price. This stance became one of the central themes of the Davos Forum and once again intensified transatlantic tensions. Yet the reality is that even with a sharp increase in military spending, Europe will not be able, over the coming years, and probably for decades, to dispense with American weapons and military infrastructure, The Economist writes.
Spending rises, dependence remains
At the 2025 NATO summit, Alliance members pledged to raise defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. Already today, European military budgets in nominal terms are roughly 50% higher than in 2022. Over the next five years, they could reach €500–700 billion annually, with nearly one third allocated to the procurement of new weapons.
However, higher spending does not automatically translate into autonomous military capabilities. European defence remains heavily dependent on the United States in key areas: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; command-and-control systems; strategic transport; long-range precision strike capabilities; and digital military infrastructure. These are precisely the elements that make a modern military effective and where any break with Washington would be most painful. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), replacing US non-nuclear weapons systems in Europe would cost between $226 and $344 billion. Even if the funds were available, this process would take years, and in some sectors, decades, especially if Europe relied solely on its own defence industry.
Ukraine as an indicator of Europe’s limits
The situation in Ukraine clearly illustrates the limits of European autonomy. Formally, Europe remains the largest provider of military assistance to Kyiv. In practice, however, a significant share of this aid consists of purchases of American weapons financed by European countries under NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL). Since 2024, Europe has spent around $5 billion through this mechanism and plans to allocate roughly $1 billion per month at least until the end of 2026. These purchases mainly involve air and missile defence systems, Patriot missiles, munitions for F-16 fighters, and other equipment that Europe cannot quickly replace with its own production.
The Economist notes that a suspension of these deliveries could have catastrophic consequences for Ukraine. Even now, Ukraine’s air defence system is under severe strain, and shortages of interceptors directly affect the protection of energy infrastructure and cities.
Washington’s potential levers of pressure
Even without a formal withdrawal from NATO, the United States retains several instruments of leverage over its allies. One of the most sensitive concerns the infrastructure surrounding F-35 fighter jets, which are becoming the backbone of the air forces of many European countries. These aircraft depend on American logistics, software updates, and the Mission Data File (MDF), which largely determines their operational effectiveness.
In addition, analysts expect a reduction in the US military presence in Europe, possibly by around 30,000 troops. A more radical scenario would involve the withdrawal or restriction of access to American intelligence and command-and-control systems, which would sharply weaken NATO’s operational capabilities.
Why the United States is also not interested in a rupture
Despite the harshness of Trump’s rhetoric, US armed forces are deeply embedded in Europe’s infrastructure: bases, headquarters, logistics networks and command centres play a central role in America’s global operations. Losing this foothold would weaken US positions not only in Europe but in other regions as well. Moreover, a sudden break with NATO would face strong opposition within the United States, both from the military leadership and from parts of Congress. There is also an economic dimension: European arms purchases generate billions of dollars for the US defence industry.
Autonomy as a long and costly project
The idea of European strategic autonomy is becoming increasingly attractive amid the volatility of US politics. In practice, however, it remains a long-term project, expensive and with uncertain outcomes. Even under the most favourable conditions, Europe will not be able to close its defence capability gaps quickly. As German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stressed at an extraordinary EU summit, Europe should at least try to preserve NATO. For now, the transatlantic alliance remains the only structure capable of providing credible collective security on the continent.
The Economist’s conclusion is clear-eyed: the emotional appeal of independence cannot override reality. Deep defence gaps cannot be closed quickly or cheaply.
