Former Russian ambassador to Colombia, Ednan Agaev has held senior positions in the Soviet and Russian Foreign Ministries, as well as at the United Nations. Based in Paris, he is now a consultant in international affairs.
Guillaume de Sardes : Le 4 décembre 2025, les États-Unis ont publié leur nouvelle doctrine stratégique (National Security Strategy). La plupart des commentateurs voient dans ce document d’une trentaine de pages un abandon de l’idéalisme des néoconservateurs (cherchant à instituer une hégémonie libérale et à exporter la démocratie) pour en revenir au réalisme de Kissinger (privilégiant l’équilibre des puissances). Quelle est votre évaluation générale de cette nouvelle doctrine ? Peut-on parler de rupture ?
Ednan Agaev: The concept of the balance of power was introduced in the early 19th century, after the Napoleonic Wars, by the Austrian Chancellor von Metternich. He defended this balance almost religiously, seeing it as a guarantee of stability for Europe. In his belief, if all the major geopolitical players were roughly equal and had comparable economic and military potential, none would dare to try to impose their views and assert their interests by force.
Today, the situation is completely different. We have a world unquestionably dominated by the United States – at least, that is their belief. With the Trump administration, this worldview has taken on maximalist forms with megalomaniacal overtones. Admittedly, previous administrations were no less convinced that they were ‘running the world’, but they favoured a more diplomatic, more polite language, creating an illusion of parity. Trump, on the contrary, in line with ‘wild westernism’, makes no attempt to moderate his arrogance or hide his contempt for his partners, whom he treats as vassals. This new approach – or rather, this dropping of the mask – shocks the majority of political leaders, as well as international public opinion. The positive side is that Trump is dispelling illusions: it is now clear that it is not possible to cooperate or discuss matters on an equal footing with the United States. This logic is based on the conviction that only force counts. This brings us back to Thucydides: ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’.
To what extent do you think the 2025 strategic doctrine takes into account the new global balance of power? According to the IMF, the five largest economies in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) are now, in order of importance: China (19.63% of global GDP), the United States (14.65%), India (8.48%), Russia (3.42%) and Japan (3.23%). Do these figures not signal the end of a unipolar world dominated by the United States?
Trump’s new national security strategy does not seem to take this reality into account. On the contrary, the message to the world is unambiguous: you all depend on the United States, so you must obey, or else you will be punished or simply abandoned and forgotten. At the same time, Washington claims to be tired of being the world’s policeman and guarantor of world peace. This claim that America alone bears the heavy burden of global security is pure hypocrisy. Never in the 250 years of American history has Washington’s policy been motivated by altruism or concern for the security and interests of others. Nothing has changed today. We must not be taken in by this rhetoric. The reality is that the economic and financial prosperity of the United States is based on its pre-eminence in international affairs. Without this dominance, the United States’ scope for action would be reduced to that of other major countries whose power is primarily economic, such as China, Japan, the European Union, etc. Washington therefore wants to continue exercising its hegemony over the world; Trump simply wants to make it even more profitable. Hence the emergence of a new American diplomatic language, marked by an abundance of terms such as ‘deal’, ‘transactions’, ‘real business’, etc.
This has led to a re-evaluation of previous arrangements. In the past, Washington’s privileged position in its relations with its partners was justified by a division of roles: America undertook to guarantee the security of its allies, agreeing to bear the lion’s share of defence-related expenditure. In return, it obtained economic advantages. Trump wants to change this principle. The United States no longer wants to automatically guarantee the security of its allies while wishing to maintain and even expand its privileges…
This approach is questionable, to say the least, because it does not even work in the business world, which is so cherished by the Trump administration. Either you are a majority shareholder and have the associated privileges and responsibilities, or you are not, and you have neither. But you cannot achieve a dominant position without investing adequately. This business reality is even more pronounced in relations between nations.
To sum up, Trump’s new strategy rejects multipolarity and reconfirms his intention to dominate other countries – especially his allies – without assuming the responsibilities associated with this role.
The three pages that the NSS devotes to Europe are in line with J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich conference in February 2025. The document refers to a ‘civilisational decline’ and ‘censorship of freedom of expression and repression of political opposition’. This observation leads to a warning: ‘If current trends continue, the continent will be unrecognisable in twenty years or less. It is therefore unclear whether certain European countries will have sufficiently strong economies and armies to remain reliable allies.’ Could you comment on this analysis? Do you think the United States will use all its influence to change Europe’s trajectory?
Europe has become the main target of criticism from the Trump administration. Tensions between the United States and Europe are nothing new. Since the Cold War era, Washington has been dissatisfied with the contribution of European NATO members to collective defence and security efforts. The difference is that previous administrations preferred to position themselves as a strict but kind big brother, while the current administration behaves like a rude and nasty stepfather. This is a superficial summary of the situation.
More profoundly, what is at stake is NATO’s purpose and Euro-Atlantic solidarity. NATO was conceived as a military bloc that, together with nuclear deterrence, played a key role in the confrontation with the Soviet bloc. NATO was the military pillar of the capitalist West against the communist East. Two world views were clashing. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and European communism, NATO’s purpose became much less clear. This was especially true for the ‘traditional’ members of the bloc (because for the new members, former allies of the Soviet Union, the problem was different and they were more inclined to accept the role of ‘little brother’ to Washington). After 1991, Western European countries became increasingly sceptical of American military adventures conducted under the NATO banner. They began to adopt increasingly independent positions vis-à-vis America. Let us remember that at the time of the American invasion of Iraq, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared that the United States preferred to deal with ‘new Europe’ rather than ‘old Europe’.
The absence of a common enemy had created a new geopolitical situation characterised by less cohesion within the Euro-Atlantic bloc. The differences that emerged during the Iraq War created a ‘new atmosphere’ in relations between Washington and Europe – particularly between Washington and Brussels, Washington and Paris, and Washington and Berlin. The gap then continued to widen. For example, the Europeans ignored Washington’s initially open opposition, which became almost hostile under Trump I, to the expansion of Europe’s cooperation with Russia in the energy sector. This caused frustration in Washington, especially among conservatives. In a sense, J.D. Vance’s speech in Munich marked the culmination of this irritation. The concrete result is Washington’s current attempt to reconfigure the European security system – without European participation. The logic is simple: Europe did not take the United States’ repeated warnings seriously and did not want to devote more attention to its security. Now Washington is washing its hands of the matter, like Pontius Pilate. In reality, Trump has not fundamentally changed US policy towards Europe. He has simply changed its tone.
If we put emotions aside, this is an opportunity for Europe to free itself from US tutelage and become more independent on the international stage. With greater freedom and independence, Europe could refuse to follow the Americans in their confrontation with China. It could also seek an agreement with Iran. But this requires consistency: one cannot simultaneously expect favours from Washington in the field of defence and distance oneself from the United States when its policies run counter to European interests.
With regard to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine since 2014, the text also makes some harsh observations: ‘The Trump administration finds itself at odds with European officials who have unrealistic expectations about the war, relying on unstable minority governments, many of which violate the fundamental principles of democracy to suppress opposition. A large majority of Europeans want peace, but this desire is not reflected in policy, largely because of the subversion of democratic processes by these governments.’ How do you think this will play out in the coming weeks and months, given that the document states that ‘it is in the fundamental interest of the United States to negotiate a rapid end to hostilities in Ukraine in order to stabilise European economies, avoid an unintended escalation or expansion of the war, and restore strategic stability with Russia, as well as to enable Ukraine’s reconstruction after hostilities to ensure its survival as a viable state.’
A distinction must be made between what the Trump administration says and what it does. Rhetoric does not necessarily reflect true intentions, if at all. When the United States declares that it is concerned about the war and deplores the deaths it causes, we must look at the facts. Today, the big losers in this war are above all Ukraine and Russia, as well as Europe. The security system has been overturned, economic ties destroyed, European energy supplies wiped out… All this will have far-reaching consequences. But who are the winners? The United States, as well as China, which now has unlimited access to Russia’s natural resources and domestic market.
Europe must take back the initiative and become the main promoter of negotiations aimed at ending this conflict. After all, it is Europe that has been Russia’s privileged partner over the last twenty years, not the United States. It is Europe that has been the main buyer of Russian gas. It is Europe that has shown openness and understanding towards Russian interests. It is Europe, particularly France and Germany, that has been the main mediator between Russia and Ukraine since the conflict began in 2014. But it is also Europe that has chosen to ignore American warnings. It was Europe that chose to look the other way and continue with ‘business as usual’, hoping that the situation would resolve itself. All this despite increasingly alarming signals coming from Moscow and warnings from Washington, including from the first Trump administration (2017-2021).
Today, Europeans complain that the Americans have sidelined them from dialogue with Moscow and are developing solutions that will be imposed on them without taking their interests into account. However, it is not too late. Europeans can and must resume their leading role in negotiations with Moscow. Are they not better placed than the Trump family’s estate agents to find diplomatic solutions that guarantee the security of the continent and restore the balance of interests? It is simply a question of will.
In its new strategic doctrine, Trump administration notes that ‘today, German chemical companies are building some of the world’s largest processing plants in China, using Russian gas that they can no longer obtain at home’. At the same time, German journalist Patrik Baab reported that one of the topics discussed by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner in Moscow was the reopening of the Nord Stream gas pipelines. As an expert in both international relations and energy infrastructure, do you think the Americans could push Germany in this direction, if only to try to distance it from China? It would also be a way of ‘re-anchoring’ Russia to the Western bloc as much as possible.
Politically, Europe has renounced all dissent. It now declares itself ready to follow obediently, provided it is not left alone to face the Russian threat, even if that threat is far from obvious… Economically, Washington has obtained what it had been asking for in vain for years: the European hydrocarbon market. Europe now buys American LNG, even though it is three times more expensive than Russian gas transported by pipeline. In addition, Europe is buying large quantities of American weapons to give to the Ukrainians. In other words, European taxpayers are financing the US military industry! It is an old American dream come true.
In this situation, does Washington really have an interest in ending hostilities and resolving the conflict? Those familiar with the purely pragmatic approach of the Americans can guess the answer… Similarly, what interest would the Americans have in reopening Nord Stream? There is simply none. The Americans’ promises to the Russians and Ukrainians are nothing more than siren songs. Consider the plans to develop the Arctic region, including the construction of a tunnel between sparsely populated Alaska and unpopulated northern Siberia. It is difficult to see what purpose it would serve, except perhaps to facilitate the migration of polar bears…
All of this is a troubling sign for Europe’s future.
It depends on how you look at it. As I said, this situation could be an opportunity for Europeans to free themselves from American domination and defend their own interests. Take China, for example. For quite some time now, the United States has been irritated by Europe’s developing ties with this great country. The Americans believe that they and they alone have the right to maintain profitable economic relations with China, since it was they – the Nixon/Kissinger administration, to be precise – who opened it up to the Western world. At the time, privileged relations with China were particularly important in the context of the global confrontation with the Soviet communist system. Kissinger believed that it was better for the United States to be close to either Moscow or Beijing than for Moscow and Beijing to be close to each other. This was known as ‘triangular diplomacy’. Today, China has become a rival to the United States, which jealously monitors its Western allies’ cooperation with China. However, it is in Europe’s interest to develop its ties with China, which is its largest trading partner in terms of total trade (imports + exports). Breaking all economic ties with China to please the Americans would have negative consequences for Europe.
How do you think transatlantic relations will evolve in the coming years?
Today, we are witnessing a crisis in Euro-Atlantic relations. This crisis stems from American irritation with Europeans, which has been growing steadily over the past two decades. However, it would be an exaggeration to say that this relationship is dead. Rather, we are witnessing a global reconfiguration: the ‘Western world’ has entered a very important moment in its existence, as the very question of its meaning is being raised… What we call the ‘Western world’ was born in the specific context of the Cold War. It was the ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union that forged its unity. With the end of the Soviet Union, this unity largely disappeared and, with it, the relevance of the notion of the ‘Western world’. Admittedly, the West is still dominated by the ideology of liberalism, but this has taken on very diverse – even divergent – forms. This is highlighted in J.D. Vance’s speech in Munich and in the new American strategic doctrine. The question, then, is whether these ideological differences will lead to a rupture.
For my part, I believe that these factors are less important than pragmatic motivations. The future of Euro-Atlanticism will depend on how Europeans and Americans view their economic and security interests. The European Union could choose to remain subservient to the United States in order to continue benefiting from its protection, but we cannot rule out the possibility that it will decide to take responsibility for its own security. In recent history, at the height of the Cold War, Charles de Gaulle’s France distanced itself from NATO by withdrawing from the integrated command, without this undermining its security. In doing so, it regained its rightful place among the world’s most important powers. This could be an inspiring example for Europe.
