Donald Trump is prepared to offer Kyiv so-called “platinum” security guarantees, comparable in scope to the obligations the United States assumes toward NATO members. But does this mean that, in the event of a new Russian strike against Ukraine, Washington would be required to enter the war?
Following negotiations between U.S. and Ukrainian delegations held in Berlin on December 14–15, the two sides moved closer to a compromise on one of Kyiv’s key demands: international security guarantees. This is precisely what Volodymyr Zelensky and his inner circle had been seeking since the very start of the peace track launched by the Trump administration after Donald Trump’s return to the White House.
For a long time, Washington consistently avoided any formal commitments. The United States was unwilling to lock in security guarantees even in exchange for access to economic assets, among them, potential future profits from the extraction of Ukraine’s mineral resources.
The situation changed in the autumn. In November, after a 28-point draft peace agreement was introduced into the negotiating process, the pace and intensity of consultations increased sharply. This forced the American side to revise its previous stance. The Berlin round ultimately resulted in U.S. agreement to consider granting Ukraine “platinum” security guarantees modeled on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
In practical terms, this would mean that the conditions triggering these guarantees for Kyiv would be identical to those applied to NATO member states. At the same time, Ukraine would formally abandon its goal of joining the Alliance, enshrining a neutral status as part of a compromise with Russia.
What does NATO’s Article 5 actually provide for?
The core provision of the Alliance’s charter is based on the principle of collective defense: an attack on one member is regarded as an attack on all. This principle underpins the entire security architecture of NATO. In public discourse, Article 5 is often interpreted in simplified terms, as an automatic obligation for all allies to enter a war immediately if one member is attacked. However, this interpretation is not entirely accurate.
What is the key nuance?
If Russia were to use force against Ukraine again, the United States would indeed be obliged to provide assistance. But the nature of that assistance is not predetermined. Article 5 does not require the automatic deployment of troops or the launch of full-scale combat operations.
Each treaty member independently determines the form of its response, ranging from military support to other forms of assistance, including political, economic, and technical measures. The text explicitly states that aid may include the use of armed force, but it is not limited to that alone.
Thus, even under a “NATO-style” guarantees framework, room for flexibility and political maneuvering remains, especially for the United States, which has traditionally sought to limit direct involvement in large-scale continental conflicts.
It is also important to emphasize that the final formulation of security guarantees for Ukraine remains unknown. It is unclear whether they will fully replicate Article 5 or be more ambiguous or, conversely, more tightly defined. Much will depend on the outcome of parallel negotiations between Washington and Moscow.
