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Donald Trump Prepares for a Possible American Invasion of Venezuela
« Venezuela has become a real Molotov cocktail for the United States ». An interview with Ednan Agaev

« Venezuela has become a real Molotov cocktail for the United States ». An interview with Ednan Agaev

Ednan Agaev Venezuela États-Unis Ednan Agaev Venezuela États-Unis

Former Russian ambassador to Colombia, Ednan Agaev has held senior positions in the Soviet and Russian Foreign Ministries, as well as at the United Nations. Based in Paris, he is now a consultant in international affairs.

Guillaume de Sardes: In recent weeks, tensions between the United States and Venezuela have increased. In early September 2025, Donald Trump responded to a question about whether the US government was seeking regime change in Venezuela by saying, “We don’t talk about that. ” The stated objective is to combat drug trafficking and illegal immigration. However, the measures taken — military deployments, naval strikes, authorisation of CIA operations — can be seen as intended to exert strong pressure on the Venezuelan government, particularly its president, Nicolás Maduro. What is your opinion on this?

Ednan Agaev: I had been expecting the US to take a tougher position on Venezuela for a long time. When Hugo Chávez first came to power, the elections were conducted in a democratic and transparent manner. His election was widely perceived by international public opinion as legitimate and fair. At that time, Venezuela, considered one of the most developed countries in Latin America, was nevertheless experiencing serious social problems. Despite its natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons, which made Venezuela one of the world’s largest oil exporters, the majority of the population lived in poverty, bordering on destitution. The country’s wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few groups of people who shared political power among themselves. A crisis in the system was almost inevitable. This is why Chávez came to power in 1999, carried by rhetoric that was a mixture of primitive Marxism, nationalism and anti-imperialism. At first, Chávez’s government had a relatively broad support base that included not only the lumpenised proletariat and junior officers, but also a large section of the middle class and even a fraction of the bourgeoisie. Unfortunately, all the energy of Chávez and his team was exhausted in endless speeches about a better future for Venezuela, condemnation of the imperialists, glorification of the so-called ‘Bolivarian revolution’ and solidarity with oppressed people. Over time, governance – which was already ineffective before Chávez – became catastrophic to the point of ruining the country.

Venezuela, which in the 1980s had a chance to become a ‘Latin American tiger,’ has been plunged into serious economic and social problems typical of Third World countries. One of the consequences has been the exodus of part of its population. The departure of the richest was quickly followed by the small bourgeoisie. Then even the poorest left. During Chávez’s last years in power, his support base was limited to the army and the repressive regime. The catastrophic economic policy of those years was accompanied by a demagogic and openly provocative foreign policy towards the United States, which proved to be very costly for the country.

The Americans were never happy about Chávez coming to power, but during the early years they let him be, not taking his fiery rhetoric too seriously. They thought his time in power would be short. However, he remained president of Venezuela until his death, a total of fourteen years. Over the years, Venezuela became a true ‘Molotov cocktail’ for the United States, each ingredient of which was a source of irritation: quasi-Marxist ideology, defensive foreign policy, alliance with Cuba and Nicaragua, flirting with Iran, etc. Alongside the deterioration of the economic situation in Venezuela, there was a sharp increase in crime. The country became a comfortable zone for drug cartels, which took advantage of the economic chaos and institutional disfunction to corrupt the police, the army and politicians.

The accusations of collusion between the Venezuelan government and drug cartels are therefore not entirely unfounded. The United States, whose population is the main market for drugs, has reason to be dissatisfied, if only because of the ineffectiveness of the measures taken by Caracas against drug traffickers. But does that justify military intervention? I would say that in certain extraordinary situations, when it comes to defending their population, states have a legitimate right to defend themselves. The activities of drug cartels are a real threat to the security of the United States. From this point of view, naval strikes against the cartels are justified.

However, we must put this in context by remembering that the Americans have already used extraordinary measures against organised crime to overthrow regimes that were not to their liking: those of Grenada, Panama and Nicaragua. In these cases – even if there is no smoke without fire – the American invasions were mainly dictated by the protection of their interests. The fight against drugs was no more than a convenient pretext.

In the case of Venezuela, there are indisputable facts. The country, if not controlled by the cartels, is at least under their influence. But unlike Grenada, which covers less than 350 km2, Venezuela is a vast country with a well-equipped and well-trained army and a population of almost 30 million, a large proportion of whom are genuinely anti-American… A large-scale military intervention there would be risky, to say the least. President Trump’s style is different from that of his predecessors, such as Reagan and Bush Sr. As we have seen, Trump often limits himself to toughening his tone and making threatening statements, hoping that this will be enough to make his interlocutors back down. Moving from words to actions would not be his style.

According to Reuters, the US armed forces have already destroyedat least fourteen boats sailing near the coast of Venezuela, killing their passengers. The reason given is that they were drug traffickers. However, these strikes are being carried out without any real legal basis, and it is difficult to justify these killings without trial. Experts from the United Nations Human Rights Council have described these strikes as ‘extrajudicial executions’. What is your expert opinion on this issue as an international relations specialist?

The actions taken by the United States, at least to date, seem to me to be rather limited and very specific. It must be acknowledged, as I said earlier, that drug trafficking has become a real threat to them. To protect their population, states sometimes have no choice but to resort to extraordinary measures. The actions of the United States seem to me to be more a matter of these extraordinary measures than an attack on Venezuela’s sovereignty. One piece of evidence for this is the rather measured reactions of other Latin American countries and even the Caribbean. If the US strikes had really been directed against innocent civilians, the reactions would have been much stronger. The opinion of human rights experts who describe these strikes as ‘extrajudicial killings’ is justified, but the US administration does not have many other options.

Furthermore, I note that the American strikes never hit the Venezuelan armed forces or police forces, and that, for their part, these forces took no measures to protect the targets hit by the Americans. These arguments are debatable, but, I repeat, the situation is extraordinary.

On 23rd October, during the 27th ministerial meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Doha, Venezuelan Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez gave another reason for the United States’ intervention. She stated: ‘They are seeking to steal our hydrocarbon resources, oil and gas.’ This would then be an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the energy sector, which, to put it simply, claims political hegemony over Latin America.

First, we need to understand what the Monroe Doctrine is. It is often cited as the ideological basis for the imperialist hegemony of the United States in Latin America. But we forget the historical context in which it was first articulated in 1823. The Monroe Doctrine reflected the United States’ determination to prevent European powers from interfering in the affairs of the American continent. Above all, it was a response to the decision of the Holy Alliance (as you will recall, this was an alliance created by the European powers that defeated Napoleon, consisting of the Austrian Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia and the Russian Empire) to restore Spain’s power over its American colonies. The Monroe Doctrine was conceived as a policy to defend the independence of the United States and the young independent states of Latin America.

The current tensions between the United States and Venezuela must also be taken into account when assessing the Venezuelan Vice-President’s statements. I think it is an exaggeration to say that the United States wants to steal its neighbour’s resources. Historically, the United States has been the largest buyer of Venezuelan oil. All refineries in Texas are designed to use this oil. Before Chávez came to power, Venezuela was one of the most prosperous countries in Latin America precisely because of these sales. So should we talk about outright theft or rather normal sales and purchases?

I am not claiming that the United States’ attitude towards Venezuela is entirely justified, but it must be acknowledged that there are many aspects of Venezuela’s conduct that would irritate any country if it were Venezuela’s neighbour.

How do you think the current American policy towards Venezuela is perceived in Latin America, particularly in Colombia and Brazil, both of which share a border with Venezuela stretching over 2,000 km? How might they react in the event of American military intervention?

The situation is certainly worrying for Venezuela’s neighbours. The economic crisis in Venezuela has already led to immigration to neighbouring countries, particularly Colombia and Brazil. Stronger US intervention could cause an uncontrollable flood of refugees and destabilise the situation within the neighbouring countries themselves. As for the reaction of Latin American countries as a whole, it is difficult to predict. There is no ‘great love’ between Maduro’s government and other Latin American countries, with the notable exceptions of Cuba and Nicaragua. Caracas has damaged its relations even with left-wing governments, notably that of Brazil. The current president of Colombia, who is a former guerrilla fighter and shares the radical left-wing ideology, has personally expressed some sympathy for the Venezuelan government, but given the history of difficult relations between the two countries, I do not believe that even with a radical left-wing president at its helm, Colombia would protest very strongly in the event of US intervention… The protests will be purely declaratory and will express the concern of the countries in the region. We can expect calls for moderation, that sort of thing, but I am almost certain that there will be no real political support.

The historically good relations between Washington and Bogotá have recently deteriorated significantly. On 24 October 2025, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Colombian President Gustavo Petro and his entourage. Their assets were frozen. To justify this, President Trump described his counterpart as an « illegal drug leader ». What do you think of these sanctions? What goal is Trump seeking to achieve through them? What could be the geopolitical consequences?

This is not the first time Washington has characterised Latin American leaders in this way. When I was ambassador to Colombia and the United States was governed by the Clinton administration, which was by no means hawkish towards Latin American countries, Washington nonetheless described the Colombian president, Ernesto Samper, as a collaborator with the narco-mafia. The United States cancelled his visa and imposed personal sanctions against him. All this despite the fact that Samper was neither left-wing nor nationalist, but a typical representative of the moderate right. He was, in fact, continuing the policy of his predecessor, President Gaviria, who was considered a hero by Washington because he had destroyed Escobar’s empire. Samper acted in the same spirit, and during his presidency, the Colombian police, in cooperation with the US DEA and CIA, first decapitated and then completely overthrew the Cali cartel. At the time, everyone considered this attitude of the United States towards Bogotá to be simply a means of pressuring the Colombian government not to stop its efforts against the cartels. In my opinion, this type of pressure is a questionable and ineffective means, but, as the Romans used to say, ‘what is permitted to Jupiter is not permitted to Caesar’… In any case, at the time, despite Washington’s very negative attitude towards Samper, relations between the United States and Colombia did not deteriorate, and cooperation remained very close, including in the key areas of security, foreign policy and defence.

Today, Colombia is led by a president who adheres to a radical left-wing, almost Marxist ideology, while the United States is led by a president who is openly hostile to anything remotely resembling socialism. Under these circumstances, we cannot expect exchanges of pleasantries between Bogotá and Washington. But I am certain that, as in Samper’s case, Trump’s aggressive attitude will not change the general line: Colombia will remain an ally of the United States in South America.

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