On 2 September 2025, during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing, Russia and China signed a legally binding memorandum governing the launch of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, a giant pipeline that is set to connect the Yamal fields to China via Mongolia by 2030. With a capacity of 50 billion cubic metres per year, this project is a decisive step in the reorientation of Russian exports towards the East and in strengthening the strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing.
Power of Siberia 2 is not just an energy infrastructure project; it symbolises a long-term geo-economic reorientation, with Russia and China further strengthening their alliance through this new energy axis. The project is mutually beneficial. For Beijing, it guarantees a massive land-based gas supply, sheltered from threats that could affect maritime routes. This will strengthen its negotiating power with major liquefied gas exporters (the United States, Qatar and Australia). For Moscow, it guarantees a reliable market, compensating the definitive loss of the European market.
This project marks a structural break between Europe and Russia. Whereas the European Union could once count on cheap gas supplies, it will now have to turn to a more competitive and costly global LNG market. With the signing of this memorandum, a ‘return to normal’ – to the situation prior to 2022 – is no longer possible: the volumes of gas formerly destined for Europe (notably via the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline that ended in Germany) are now promised to China for at least 30 years.
The implications for the European Union are significant: a structural increase in energy prices, with increased volatility in winter; loss of industrial competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States, which benefits from abundant and cheap energy, and vis-à-vis China, which is simultaneously securing its energy supplies; geopolitical weakening, since Brussels no longer has any structural ties with Russia.
European officials may well highlight the rapid development of renewable energies, but the comparison with the once-accessible Russian gas is unfavorable. Siberian gas delivered by pipeline offered abundant, controllable and cheap energy. In contrast, renewables (solar, wind) require massive initial investments, regular renewal and costly storage infrastructure to compensate for their variability. Even though their unit costs have fallen, their effective yield remains limited by their intermittency and the need to densify the network. The EU has thus replaced stable and competitive energy with a more expensive, less predictable model that is dependent on supplements (LNG, coal or nuclear), increasing its industrial handicap vis-à-vis its competitors.
This disaster is the result of a political choice: the current European ruling class, which has proven to be particularly incompetent and blind to energy realities, has prioritised short-term confrontation at the expense of a long-term security strategy. By impulsively cutting itself off from Russian gas – which has had none of the desired effects on the course of the war in Ukraine – it has plunged the EU into lasting energy fragility, which will inevitably accelerate its economic decline. The effects are already being felt, but the worst is yet to come.
