In the space of a few days in early September 2026, the Houthis achieved their most spectacular territorial advance in years: the capture of the port of Mokha, followed by the strategic island of Perim, less than 80 kilometers from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This breakthrough is not merely a local military victory. It confirms the return of Yemen\u2019s civil war on a large scale, two months after the collapse of the 2022 truce, and it places Saudi Arabia in a position of strategic isolation for which it bears substantial responsibility.<\/p>\n\n
An Offensive on the World\u2019s Second Oil Chokepoint<\/strong><\/p>\n\n Since the resumption of hostilities in July, the Houthis have methodically advanced up Yemen\u2019s western coast. After the truce was broken by a joint Saudi-Yemeni strike on Sanaa airport \u2014 targeting an Iranian flight suspected of carrying commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps \u2014 the movement declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia, escalated attacks on Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea, and then struck the kingdom\u2019s energy infrastructure directly at Jizan and Yanbu.<\/p>\n\n The capture of Mokha, followed by Perim, marks a turning point: the Houthis are no longer content to threaten maritime traffic from their historic strongholds in the north \u2014 they are now consolidating territorial control over the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb, the world\u2019s second-largest oil chokepoint after the Strait of Hormuz, which is already nearly closed off by the US-Israeli war against Iran. The consequences were immediate: Brent crude jumped, shipping companies are recalculating their war-risk premiums, and analysts are already discussing a possible massive and costly diversion of traffic around the Cape of Good Hope.<\/p>\n\n Saudi Arabia\u2019s Strategic Error: Striking Its Own Flank<\/strong><\/p>\n\n If Saudi Arabia is facing this Houthi offensive today in unprecedented regional isolation, it is largely because it opened a second front of its own against its closest ally in the anti-Houthi coalition: the United Arab Emirates.<\/p>\n\n In late December 2025, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), the separatist coalition backed by Abu Dhabi, launched a lightning offensive in the provinces of Hadramawt and Mahra. Riyadh, which backs the sitting government, responded with force: airstrikes on STC positions, including an attack on the port of Mukalla explicitly described as targeting Emirati arms shipments, and \u2014 the true breaking point \u2014 the bombing of two Emirati vessels. The Yemeni government, under Saudi influence, in turn denounced its joint defense agreement with the UAE and ordered the withdrawal of Emirati troops from the country within 24 hours.<\/p>\n\n Abu Dhabi chose the path of de-escalation and withdrew its troops \u2014 but the damage was done. The STC\u2019s leader, accused of treason, fled to the UAE via Somaliland; the movement formally dissolved itself in early January. On paper, Riyadh appeared to have won: the southern secession was halted, and the authority of the Aden-based government restored. But that victory came at a cost: Saudi Arabia had just demonstrated to its longtime partner, the United Arab Emirates, that it was prepared to strike it militarily the moment their interests diverged on the Yemeni battlefield.<\/p>\n\n Yet it was precisely this tacit solidarity between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi \u2014 one supplying diplomatic and financial cover, the other ground forces in the south \u2014 that had allowed the Houthis to be contained on two simultaneous fronts since 2015. By breaking that partnership over a domestic Yemeni political dispute, Saudi Arabia deprived itself of an ally that might today have reopened a southern front against the Houthis, or at the very least secured its rear in Hadramawt and Mahra. As a result, it must now face a Houthi offensive backed by Tehran largely on its own, while the Emiratis, burned by the experience, watch from a distance.<\/p>\n\n Consequences That Extend Far Beyond Yemen<\/strong><\/p>\n\n This Saudi isolation comes at the worst possible moment. Iran, locked in open conflict with the United States and Israel since February, has an interest in seeing its Houthi allies advance toward the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait, since every kilometer of Yemeni coastline captured strengthens its negotiating leverage against Washington. For their part, the Houthis have already signaled their intent to retaliate against any Saudi strike \u2014 54 raids claimed within twelve hours of clashes in early September \u2014 while Pakistan is now publicly raising the possibility of activating the Mecca defense pact, a sign that the crisis is spilling well beyond Yemen\u2019s borders.<\/p>\n\n On the economic front, major global shipping lines, wary after three years of Red Sea attacks, are already recalculating their routes. A de facto closure of Bab el-Mandeb, combined with the near-paralysis of the Strait of Hormuz, would deal the global economy a fresh shock comparable to the oil crises of the 1970s.<\/p>\n\n A Lesson to Draw<\/strong><\/p>\n\n History may well remember that the Houthi offensive of summer 2026 owed its success to a Saudi strategic blunder: treating a tactical dispute with its Emirati partner as a higher priority than the cohesion of the anti-Houthi front. In seeking to crush a local secession by force, Riyadh fractured the alliance that had, for a decade, served as its principal asset against Tehran and its allies. It is now paying the price on the Red Sea coast \u2014 and the rest of the world, through oil prices and rising maritime insurance premiums, is beginning to pay its share too.<\/p>\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"In the space of a few days in early September 2026, the Houthis achieved their most spectacular territorial…","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"csco_display_header_overlay":false,"csco_singular_sidebar":"","csco_page_header_type":"","csco_page_load_nextpost":"","csco_post_video_location":[],"csco_post_video_location_hash":"","csco_post_video_url":"","csco_post_video_bg_start_time":0,"csco_post_video_bg_end_time":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[38],"tags":[48],"class_list":["post-8269","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","category-geopolitics","tag-articles-en","cs-entry","cs-video-wrap"],"yoast_head":"\n